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In 2007, “Emely” fled a violent Central American country, hoping for 
protection in the United States (U.S.) from a male gang leader who, intending to 
“cure” her of her sexual orientation, raped and impregnated her.1  But when 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers apprehended Emely near the 
border after she entered the U.S. without inspection, no one asked her about this 
or any other past experience, despite being required to do so.2  Instead, the CBP 
officer instructed Emely, who does not speak English and has only a sixth grade 
education, to sign a form written in English.3  Then, without ever appearing 
before an immigration judge, Emely was deported.4  This process is known as 
“expedited removal.”5  It applies when a noncitizen seeks entry with fraudulent 
or no travel documents, or when a noncitizen is apprehended within 100 miles 
of the border within two weeks of entering without inspection.6  It is the most 
                                                        
 1. Where indicated, this Article uses pseudonyms to protect the confidentiality of individuals 
with pending claims.  Emely’s records are on file with the Author’s law office. 
 2. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2012) (providing that immigration officers must screen 
noncitizens flagged for expedited removal and refer those who indicate a fear of persecution or 
intent to apply for asylum to a credible fear interview with an asylum officer). 
 3. See supra note 1 (DHS records indicate that CBP noted on this form that Emely expressed 
no fear of removal when asked about it, and was “amenable” to expedited removal.). 
 4. Id. 
 5. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (outlining that certain noncitizens must be expeditiously removed 
without a hearing unless they indicate a fear of persecution or an intention to apply for asylum); 
see also JOHN F. SIMANSKI, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 
2013 2 (Sept. 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_20 
13.pdf (defining “expedited removal” as “removal without a hearing before an immigration judge 
of an alien arriving in the United States who is inadmissible because the individual does not possess 
valid entry documents or is inadmissible for fraud or misrepresentation of material fact; or the 
removal of an alien who has not been admitted or paroled in the United States and who has not 
affirmatively shown to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien had been physically 
present in the United States for the immediately preceding 2-year period”). 
 6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (referencing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7), which renders 
noncitizens inadmissible if they do not possess valid travel documents); see also Shoba Sivaprasad 
Wadhia, The Rise of Speed Deportation and the Role of Discretion, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 1, 6 
(2014) (“Expedited removal applies to persons who arrive at a port-of-entry or within 100 miles of 
the border with fraudulent or insufficient documents.”).  As originally enacted, Congress mandated 
expedited removal for any noncitizens arriving in the U.S. without valid travel documents, except 
for Cubans arriving by plane.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), (b)(1)(F).  At the same time, however, 
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common method by which the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
removes noncitizens.7   These removal orders are completely insulated from 
judicial review.8 
A few months later, Emely fled to the U.S. again.9  Shortly after entering 
without inspection for a second time, CBP apprehended her.  Because she had 
illegally reentered the country after being deported pursuant to a final order of 
removal, CBP reinstated her prior removal order and, without asking about her 
fear of removal, again deported her.10  This process is known as “reinstatement 
of removal.”11  It is triggered when a noncitizen illegally reenters the U.S. after 
being removed or voluntarily departing pursuant to final order of removal.12  
When a noncitizen’s prior order is reinstated, they are permanently barred from 
applying for or receiving “any relief” under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
                                                        
Congress also gave the Attorney General the “sole and unreviewable discretion” to expand the 
application of expedited removal “at any time” to include undocumented noncitizens apprehended 
inside the United States within two years of entry.  Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii).  The Attorney General 
has exercised this authority several times over the past twenty years; today, the following 
noncitizens are subject to expedited removal proceedings: non-Cuban noncitizens arriving at ports-
of-entry without valid travel documents, undocumented non-Cuban noncitizens who entered by sea 
within two years of their apprehension, and undocumented noncitizens apprehended within 100 
miles of the border within two weeks of their entry without inspection.  Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (non-
Cuban aliens arriving at ports of entry); Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal 
Under Section 235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,924, 
68,924–25 (Nov. 13, 2002) (undocumented non-Cuban aliens entering by sea within two years of 
their apprehension); Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877, 48,877 (Aug. 
11, 2004) (undocumented aliens apprehended within 100 miles of the border within two weeks of 
their entry). 
 7. SIMANSKI, supra note 5, at 5 tbl.7 (showing that in the fiscal year of 2013, the majority 
of all removed noncitizens were expedited removals). 
 8. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (providing that noncitizens must be removed pursuant to 
expedited removal orders “without further hearing or review unless the alien indicates either an 
intention to apply for asylum under section 1158 of this title or a fear of persecution”); 8 C.F.R. § 
235.3(b)(7) (2016) (providing that at least a “second line supervisor” must review interviewing 
officer’s expedited removal order before it is final; this review must include “a review of the sworn 
statement and any answers and statements made by the alien regarding a fear of removal or return”); 
see also David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40 
VA. J. INT’L L. 673, 686 (2000) (noting that in expedited removal, a “[CBP] officer can serve such 
an [expedited removal] order after the secondary inspection interview, but only following review 
of the sworn statement and proposed order by a high-level supervisor.  The process takes a matter 
of hours . . . .”). 
 9. See supra note 1. 
 10. Id. (CBP records indicate that when asked, Emely did not express a fear of removal; 
however, Emely claims she was never asked about her fear during this reinstatement interview.). 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) states: 
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after 
having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior 
order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened 
or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, 
and the alien shall be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry. 
 12. Id. 
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(INA).13  Reinstatement of removal is the second most common method of 
removal.14  Like expedited removal orders, reinstated orders of removal are 
issued by CBP officers and are not subject to judicial review.15  In fiscal year 
(FY) 2015, DHS removed 165,935 noncitizens through expedited and reinstated 
of removal orders (70.49% of all removals).16 
In 2014, Emely’s rapist began phone stalking her from prison, demanding to 
have sex with her, and threatening to kill her if she refused.17  After the rapist’s 
messenger approached her in her neighborhood, and warned her that she would 
be abducted and taken to the rapist soon, Emely fled to the U.S., again making 
the weeks-long, arduous journey across Central America and Mexico, and 
ultimately wading through the Rio Grande into the U.S.18 
Shortly after illegally entering for a third time, CBP apprehended Emely and 
placed her in reinstatement of removal proceedings again.19  However, this time, 
CBP asked Emely whether she had a fear of removal.  Emely answered that she 
did, and CBP referred her to a “reasonable fear” interview; the first step in 
obtaining a form of relief from removal called “withholding of removal.”20  
After being found to have a “reasonable fear” of persecution in that interview, 
Emely’s claim was sent to an immigration judge for a hearing on the merits of 
her withholding of removal claim. 21   These proceedings are referred to as 
“withholding-only” pursuant to federal regulations mandating that noncitizens 
with reinstated removal orders may apply for withholding of removal only—not 
asylum.22  Thus, because of her reinstated removal order, Emely was deprived 
of the chance to apply for asylum.23 
                                                        
 13. Id. 
 14. SIMANSKI, supra note 5, at 5 tbl.7 (reporting that of the noncitizens removed in the fiscal 
year 2013, 170,247 (38.8%) were removed pursuant to reinstated orders of removal). 
 15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (providing that a reinstated removal order “is not subject to 
being reopened or reviewed”); see also Wadhia, supra note 6, at 8 (noting that reinstated removal 
orders that are unilaterally issued by the DHS are not subject to any judicial review; however, when 
an immigration judge denies a noncitizen’s withholding of removal claim and issues a reinstated 
removal order, the noncitizen can appeal the legality of this reinstated removal order to “a federal 
court of appeals through a legal vehicle called a ‘petition for review.’”). 
 16. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ICE ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL OPERATIONS 
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2015 8 (Dec. 22, 2015), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Report/2016/fy2015removalStats.pdf. 
 17. See supra note 1. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(b)(1), 208.31(c) (2016) (defining a “reasonable fear” as 
a “reasonable possibility” that the noncitizen will be persecuted or tortured on a protected ground 
in his home country). 
 22. 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (providing that noncitizens expressing a fear of persecution or torture 
must be referred to an asylum officer for a “reasonable fear” interview). 
 23. See supra note 1.  During her withholding-only proceedings, the presiding immigration 
judge found Emely was credible, but still denied her claim, finding Emely, who was pro se, had not 
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The difference between withholding of removal and asylum is dramatic.  To 
begin with, the legal standard for establishing withholding of removal eligibility 
is significantly higher than the asylum standard, and therefore more difficult to 
meet.24  Moreover, considering reports that immigration judges find only 2% of 
pro se applicants eligible for asylum, the likelihood of obtaining withholding of 
removal when pro se is nearly impossible.25  Additionally, the legal benefits 
flowing from withholding are scant compared to those flowing from asylum.  
Noncitizens granted asylum are placed on a path to citizenship, are granted work 
authorization, and are permitted to travel outside the country.26  By contrast, 
withholding affords only the right not to be removed to the country of 
persecution; it neither confers a right to remain in the U.S., nor protection from 
                                                        
established eligibility for withholding.  Meeting the withholding standard is far more difficult than 
establishing asylum eligibility, and even that is nearly impossible to do for pro se litigants.  In May 
2015, the Author represented Emely in her appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), and 
argued the BIA should remand because, among other things, the federal regulation mandating these 
“withholding-only” proceedings conflicts with the INA.  The BIA remanded, but on other grounds, 
and without addressing the regulation’s validity.  In March of 2017, an immigration judge granted 
Emely withholding of removal. 
24. See, e.g., Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2010). 
Withholding of removal requires the petitioner to demonstrate his or her “life or freedom 
would be threatened in that country because of the petitioner’s race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”  Similar to asylum, a 
petitioner may establish eligibility for withholding of removal (A) by establishing a 
presumption of fear of future persecution based on past persecution, or (B) through an 
independent showing of clear probability of future persecution. 
Unlike asylum, however, the petitioner must show a “clear probability” of the threat to 
life or freedom if deported to his or her country of nationality.  The Supreme Court has 
defined “clear probability” to mean “it is more likely than not” that the petitioner would 
be subject to persecution on account of one of the protected grounds.  The clear 
probability standard is more stringent than the well-founded fear standard for asylum. 
Id. at 1091 (citations omitted). 
 25. Charles Kuck, Legal Assistance for  Asylum Seekers in Expedited Removal: A Survey of 
Alternative Practices, in 2 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EXPERT 
REPORTS 239 (2005), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_ 
seekers/ERS_RptVolII.pdf (“Of those individuals found to have a credible fear, who were 
subsequently represented by counsel, 25[%] were granted asylum by an Immigration Judge; 
whereas, only 2[%] of those not represented by counsel were granted asylum.” (footnotes omitted)); 
see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY2014 STATISTICS YEARBOOK K5 fig.20 (Mar. 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/pages/attachments/2015/03/16/fy14syb.pdf (reporting that in the 
FY2014, immigration courts granted only 1,463 withholding-of-removal claims, and denied the 
remaining 11,052 claims); see also Julianne Hing, What’s the Difference Between a Refugee and a 
Deportee? A Lawyer., THE NATION (Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/whats-the-
difference-between-and-a-refugee-and-a-deportee-a-lawyer/ (quoting Lisa Koop of the National 
Immigrant Justice Center stating that “[f]or someone who’s a bona fide asylum seeker, the single 
biggest factor which determines whether they’re able to secure protection is whether they have an 
attorney”). 
 26. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FACT SHEET: 
ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL RELIEF, CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
PROTECTIONS (Jan. 15, 2009), http://1.usa.gov/1nOG2q9. 
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removal to any other country, nor the ability to travel outside the country.27  This 
“relief” from removal essentially places the noncitizen in immigration 
purgatory, belonging nowhere indefinitely yet separated forever from their 
family.28  Thus, pursuant to the withholding-only regulation, a removal order, 
most often issued during expedited removal proceedings by a low-level CBP 
officer with no judicial oversight, carries serious consequences for noncitizens 
fleeing persecution, who, like Emely, find themselves stuck in the reinstatement 
pipeline based on a removal order that was entered in error to begin with. 
This Article is the first academic piece to argue that the reinstatement of prior 
orders of removal should not bar individuals like Emely from access to asylum.  
Part I provides background about the legislative history that gave rise to the 
regulatory scheme that restricts individuals with reinstated orders of removal to 
withholding of removal access only.  Part II examines a circuit split regarding 
the proper interpretation of the INA and the regulatory scheme, and argues that 
it is unreasonable to interpret the INA as prohibiting individuals with reinstated 
orders from applying for asylum.  Part III presents policy arguments that further 
support why reinstated removal should not bar a noncitizen’s access to asylum.  
These policy arguments emphasize numerous errors that are routinely made by 
border patrol agents in issuing expedited removal orders, including their failure 
to ask mandatory questions designed to assess whether the individual has a fear 
of being harmed in her country of origin.  Finally, Part IV makes specific 
recommendations to the DHS, immigration courts, federal appellate courts, and 
Congress to help ensure that bona fide asylum seekers receive proper protection 
in the U.S. 
I.  IIRIRA’S REVISIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS: THE STATUTORY AND 
REGULATORY BASIS FOR DENYING ASYLUM ACCESS TO NONCITIZENS WITH 
REINSTATED REMOVAL ORDERS 
The expedited and reinstatement removal methods, in addition to the 
withholding-only regulatory scheme, stem from the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).  Before IIRIRA, a 
noncitizen could not be removed from the U.S. without first appearing before an 
                                                        
 27. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1999) (“Whereas withholding only 
bars deporting an alien to a particular country or countries, a grant of asylum permits an alien to 
remain in the United States and to apply for permanent residency after one year.”); see also Letter 
from Ten Immigration and Human Rights Orgs. to John Roth, Inspector Gen., Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec. & Megan H. Mack, Officer of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of Homeland Sec. 6 (Nov. 
13, 2014) [hereinafter Right to Asylum Letter], http://www.lccr.com/wp-content/uploads/Right-to-
Asylum-CRCL-Complaint-Cover-Letter.pdf (noting that “[a] grant of withholding of removal, 
unlike a grant of asylum, does not allow an applicant to sponsor a spouse or children for derivative 
status,” thereby “forc[ing the noncitizen] to choose between reuniting with family and 
compromising their own safety” (citing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 26)). 
 28. See Right to Asylum Letter, supra note 27. 
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immigration judge. 29   If the noncitizen raised an asylum claim during this 
appearance, the immigration judge would determine whether the noncitizen is a 
“refugee,”—that is, the noncitizen either suffered past persecution or has a 
“well-founded fear” of future persecution—and is therefore eligible for 
asylum. 30   “[V]irtually all immigration court decisions,” including asylum 
eligibility decisions, “could be appealed to a regular federal court and decided 
by judges who, unlike immigration judges, were independent of the Department 
of Justice and had life tenure.”31  But, as Emely’s story illustrated, IIRIRA’s new 
expedited removal and reinstatement procedures changed things significantly, 
especially for asylum seekers,32 who comprise approximately 22% (51,001) of 
the noncitizens in expedited removal each year.33 
This Part sets forth the background to the relevant changes IIRIRA made to 
the INA, which resulted in the promulgation of the withholding-only regulatory 
scheme.  It first discusses the political climate in which IIRIRA was crafted; 
                                                        
 29. PHILIP G. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO SAVE 
POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 228–29 (2000). 
 30. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 (1987) (finding a “refugee” is “any person 
who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no 
nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable 
or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, 
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” (quoting 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1980)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(i) (2016) (providing that a fear 
of persecution is “well-founded” if (A) she has a fear of persecution in her country; (B) there is a 
reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution; and (C) she is unable or unwilling to return to 
that country because of such fear.)  The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General 
are the ultimate authorities on whether asylum is granted; even if an immigration judge finds an 
applicant eligible, the Attorney General can still deny asylum relief.  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) 
(2012) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien 
who has applied for asylum . . . .”). 
 31. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 228–29 (noting that noncitizens won 25–40% of these appeals, 
indicating that immigration judges make “a lot of” procedural and substantive errors). 
 32. See Kate Jastram & Tala Hartsough, A-File and Record of Proceeding Analysis of 
Expedited Removal, in 2 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EXPERT 
REPORTS 52 (2005), http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seek 
ers/ERS_RptVolII.pdf (noting that refugees fleeing from persecution often use “false documents 
or documents obtained by misrepresentation,” which triggers their placement in expedited removal, 
because “they are often unable to obtain a passport or visa in their own name and must leave their 
country surreptitiously”). 
 33. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. 
OMBUDSMAN, ANNUAL REPORT 2015 59 (June 29, 2015), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/ 
publications/2015%20CISOMB%20Annual%20Report_508.pdf (reporting that in FY2014, 
USCIS received 51,001 credible fear referrals).  The most recent data the DHS has released 
itemizing the number of noncitizens removed through expedited removal was for FY2013.   
See SIMANSKI, supra note 5, at 2.  Based on an average growth trend from fiscal years 2011 through 
2013 (35,398) added to the 193,032 expeditiously removed in FY2013, approximately 228,430 
people were expeditiously removed in FY2014.  Thus, 51,001 credible fear interview referrals 
issued in FY2014 represents 22% of the approximate number of all people expeditiously removed 
in FY2014. 
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namely, Americans’ anti-immigrant sentiment and belief that the asylum system 
was being abused, which is important to understanding Congress’s intent when 
it simultaneously amended the asylum and reinstatement provisions and created 
the expedited removal process.  This Part then discusses the changes IIRIRA 
made to these statutory provisions, and the subsequent promulgation of the 
withholding-only regulatory scheme.  It then concludes with facts from several 
cases that illustrate the outcome this regulatory scheme has on bona fide asylum 
seekers. 
A.  Legislative Context: The American Anti-Immigrant, Anti-Asylum Seeker 
Political Environment of the 1990s 
 Americans’ anti-immigrant sentiment increased significantly in the three 
decades leading up to the 1996 enactment of IIRIRA.34  By the mid-1990s, this 
sentiment had reached a fever pitch.35  This trend was partly due to a weak 
economy.36  It was also due to two unprecedented terror attacks committed on 
American soil by lawfully present asylum seekers.37 
The first attack occurred in January 1993, when a Pakistani asylum-seeker 
named Mir Aimal Kasi gunned down Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
employees who were waiting in their cars at a stoplight just outside Agency 
headquarters.38  Kasi shot an AK-47 eleven times, and killed two men and 
wounded three others.39  Kasi had entered the U.S. on a business visa in 1991, 
and about a year later, filed an asylum application that “included few details of 
the political persecution he claimed to fear in Pakistan.”40  This application was 
still pending when he attacked the CIA employees.41 
                                                        
 34. Joseph Carroll, American Public Opinion About Immigration, GALLUP (July 26, 2005), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/14785/immigration.aspx (explaining that from 1965 to 1995, the 
number of polled Americans who believed that immigration should be decreased nearly doubled—
from 33% in 1965 to 65% in 1995). 
 35. Id. (showing that from 1985 to 2005, the highest percentage of polled Americans who 
favored a decrease in immigration occurred from July 1993 through June 1995). 
 36. Seth Mydans, Poll Finds Tide of Immigration Brings Hostility, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 
1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/27/us/poll-finds-tide-of-immigration-brings-hostility.ht 
ml (analyzing the growing “public reaction against immigration,” and noting that of the Americans 
polled, “[m]any cited the economy as a factor in their opinion”). 
 37. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 38–39; Mydans, supra note 36 (quoting the then-director of 
the Refugee Project of the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, “[i]f you can picture the image 
of the Statue of Liberty dissolving and being replaced by the image of the World Trade Center after 
it was bombed, you have the sense of the negative trends in the current debate”). 
 38. Richard A. Serrano, Pakistani Who Killed 2 at CIA Is Executed, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 
2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/nov/15/nation/na-execute15 (“Just as CIA employees were 
reporting to work on Jan. 25, 1993, Kasi stepped out of his pickup and began firing an AK-47 rifle 
near the entrance to the agency’s headquarters.”). 
 39. Id. 
 40. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 38. 
 41. Id.; see also Serrano, supra note 38 (reporting that on November 14, 2002, Mir Aimal 
Kasi was executed by lethal injection). 
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The second attack occurred about a month later, when another asylum seeker 
with Pakistani connections, Ramzi Yousef, detonated a car bomb in New York 
City’s World Trade Center parking garage. 42   Six people died, and over a 
thousand others were wounded.43  It was “‘the largest-scale bombing on U.S. 
soil in modern history’ in terms of fatalities and material damage.” 44   It 
“generated so much physical force that it created a five-story crater.”45  Yousef 
entered the U.S. after requesting asylum at the Kennedy Airport; he was not 
detained prior to his asylum hearing because the nearest detention center was 
full, “as usual.”46  His asylum application was still pending when, only a month 
after arriving in the U.S., he detonated the bomb.47  He flew back to Pakistan 
within hours of the explosion.48 
Prior to these attacks, New York Immigration and Nationality Services 
District Director William Slattery had complained for years that noncitizens 
arriving at Kennedy Airport were purposely abusing the asylum process by 
making false claims of persecution, knowing that they would be allowed to enter 
indefinitely—and given work authorization immediately.49  With America still 
reeling from these terror attacks, Slattery “seized the moment to make public 
appearances railing against the humanitarian leniencies of the asylum system,” 
                                                        
 42. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 39. 
 43. Richard A. Serrano, After 15 Years in Solitary, Convicted Terrorist Pleads for Contact 
with Others, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/16/nation/la-na-
yousef-solitary-20130217. 
 44. Douglas Jehl, Car Bombs: A Tool of Foreign Terror, Little Known in U.S., N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 27, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/02/27/nyregion/explosion-twin-towers-car-bombs-
tool-foreign-terror-little-known-us.html (quoting terrorism expert Brian Jenkins). 
 45. Matt Pearce, 20 Years Ago, a Bomb Killed Six People at the World Trade Center, L.A. 
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/26/nation/la-na-nn-1993-world-trade-
center-anniversary-20130226 (reporting that “the blast also generated so much emotional force that 
officials erected a granite memorial—a fountain—bearing the victims’ names”: John DiGiovanni, 
Robert Kirkpatrick, Stephen Knapp, William Macko, Wilfred Mercado, and Monica Rodriguez 
Smith, who was pregnant). 
 46. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 39. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id.; see also Serrano, supra note 43 (reporting that Yousef was later brought back to the 
U.S. where, in addition to the World Trade Center bombing, “he was also convicted of trying to 
kill Pope John Paul II and President Clinton and trying to bomb 11 airliners on their way from Asia 
to the U.S.”  At his sentencing, Yousef unapologetically told the judge: “Yes, I am a terrorist, and 
proud of it.”  He is currently “serving life with no parole plus 240 years.”  He has been in 24-hour 
solitary confinement for the past fifteen years.  His cell is 7-by-11 feet, has no bars, and one small 
window.  His meals are “shoved by unseen guards through a sally port between two steel doors.”  
His uncle, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, is believed to be the September 11 mastermind.). 
 49. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 39–40, 246 (discussing procedural issues with processing 
asylum claims in the 1990s, such as the “INS policy of granting work authorization to all affirmative 
asylum applicants without creating an adjudication staff large enough to interview the applicants 
promptly, and laws and regulations that provided scant preliminary asylum screening and 
inadequate detention space at ports of entry, particularly New York, which seemed swamped by 
aliens arriving with false documents”). 
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hoping that by playing the “media card,” he would get Congress’s attention.50  
This publicity campaign included interviews with Newsday, the Los Angeles 
Times, and the New York Times, where he reported that two-thirds of asylum 
applicants leave Kennedy Airport, never to be seen again, and that “people know 
they’ve got a 93% chance of walking right through into the United States,” 
because “only 7% of all inadmissible aliens are detained.”51 
But rather than encouraging Congress to build more detention centers, he told 
reporters that “Congress must change the law to allow him to send most of them 
packing after a quick hearing at Kennedy . . . . The aliens have taken control.”52  
This idea of “summary exclusion,” or “expedited removal” as it was later 
enacted, was not new; a Senator had unsuccessfully advocated for it during the 
Reagan administration.53 
In March 1993, Mr. Slattery did an interview with 60 Minutes that generated 
“massive” national attention.54  As video footage cut between scenes of terrorists 
and immigrants arriving at Kennedy Airport played on screen, 60 Minutes 
reporter Lesley Stahl’s voice explained that Sheik Rahman—an asylum-seeker 
in the U.S. who had been charged with plotting terror attacks on U.S. landmarks 
and who had connections to the World Trade Center bomber—was “just one of 
hundreds of thousands of foreigners who have found an almost foolproof 
formula to stay in the United States.”55  One of Ms. Stahl’s guests stated that 
“every single person on the planet Earth . . . can stay [in the U.S.] indefinitely 
by saying two magic words: political asylum.”56  Mr. Slattery agreed, stating 
that “you don’t know what they have done, you really don’t even know their real 
names, and minimum, they’re in this country for eighteen months.”57 
In the months following the 60 Minutes broadcast, anti-immigrant sentiment 
in the U.S. reached a record high.58   Nearly 70% of Americans favored a 
decrease in immigration, and 68% believed that “most of the people who have 
                                                        
 50. Deborah Sontag, Waiting for a Rudder at I.N.S., N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 1993), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/13/nyregion/waiting-for-a-rudder-at-ins.html (reporting that at 
the time, “advocates for immigrants ha[d] long criticized the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service for its backlogged system, [and] Mr. Slattery and other officials turned the tables, blaming 
the supposedly crafty immigrants who stormed the gates”); see also SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 40 
(author and Georgetown University Law Center Professor Philip G. Schrag’s personal interview 
with Slattery in which Mr. Slattery stated he intentionally “play[ed] the media card”). 
 51. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 40–41. 
 52. Id. at 41. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 42–43. 
 55. Id. at 42. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 43. 
 58. Carroll, supra note 34 (discussing data showing that from 1985 to 2005, the highest 
percentage of polled Americans (65%) who favored a decrease in immigration occurred from July 
1993 through June 1995); see also Mydans, supra note 36 (finding that 61% of polled Americans 
favored a decrease in immigration in June 1993). 
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moved to the United States in the last few years are here illegally.”59  For 
context, in 1986, less than half of Americans shared these views.60  This new 
social trend “imparted real power to political demands for a retrenchment,” and 
Congressional hearings “proliferated on what was suddenly being portrayed as 
an asylum crisis.” 61   It was with these social and political undertones that 
Congress crafted and enacted one of the largest overhauls of immigration law in 
U.S. history: the IIRIRA.62 
B.  IIRIRA’s Amendments to the INA and DHS’s Response 
Given its constituents’ concerns, it is unsurprising that Congress’s primary 
goals in enacting IIRIRA were to reduce illegal immigration and curb the 
perceived abuse of the asylum process. 63   To meet these goals, Congress 
simultaneously (1) created the expedited removal process, (2) revamped the 
existing reinstatement of removal process, and (3) amended the asylum 
provision.  These revisions are examined below, as is (4) the withholding-only 
regulation promulgated shortly after the enactment of IIRIRA. 
1.  The Expedited Removal Provision 
Congress’s goals of reducing illegal immigration and the abuse of asylum, 
while still protecting bona fide asylum seekers, are both apparent in the 
expedited removal provision.  This provision provides that noncitizens who seek 
entry without valid documents or were apprehended within 100 miles of the 
border within two weeks of entering without inspection are removed virtually 
on the spot, without ever appearing before an immigration judge, pursuant to a 
final, unreviewable removal order issued by a CBP officer.64 
But, to prevent the expedited removal of bona fide asylum seekers, Congress 
included a critical detail in the expedited removal statutory provision: if a 
noncitizen flagged for expedited removal “indicates either an intention to apply 
for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the [noncitizen] for 
                                                        
 59. Mydans, supra note 36; see also SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 53 n.114; Carrol, supra note 
34 (discussing data showing that more than 65% of Americans polled between June and July 1993 
favored a decrease in immigration). 
 60. Mydans, supra note 36. 
 61. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 45, 53. 
 62. See, e.g., Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 423 (2009) (observing that the IIRIRA 
“substantially amended” the INA); Marogi v. Jenifer, 126 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1059 n.3 (E.D. Mich. 
2000) (“IIRIRA . . . was Congress’s latest major overhaul of the immigration laws.”); James E. 
Crowe, III, Comment, Running Afoul of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Expedited Removal 
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 18 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 291, 291 n.3 (1999) (noting that “[t]he last comprehensive overhaul of the [INA] is considered 
to have been the Immigration Act of 1952”). 
 63. See, e.g., In re C-W-L-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 346, 349 (B.I.A. 2007) (“[The IIRIRA] was 
intended, in part, to curb abuse of the asylum process and other parts of removal proceedings.”). 
 64. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2012). 
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an interview by an asylum officer.”65  To elicit a noncitizen’s indications of fear 
or an intent to apply for asylum, Congress instructed CBP officers to interview 
noncitizens in expedited removal proceedings.66  DHS policies mandate that this 
interview entail reading a script that not only explains the purpose of the 
interview, but also asks the noncitizen four questions, three of which are clearly 
designed to elicit expressions of fear.67  If the noncitizen expresses a fear during 
the course of this interview, the CBP officer is instructed to refer that noncitizen 
to a “credible fear” interview with an asylum officer.68  If the asylum officer 
then finds the noncitizen has a credible fear, the asylum claim is then heard by 
an immigration judge, who, like under pre-IIRIRA procedures, determines 
whether the noncitizen has a well-founded fear of persecution and is a refugee.69 
In sum, Congress set the bar for providing referrals extremely low—to a mere 
“indication” of fear or intent to seek asylum, rather than requiring a literal 
expression of fear and certainly not a fear based on a protected ground—while 
also explicitly placing the responsibility of assessing the merits of asylum claims 
in the hands of a trained asylum officer and immigration judge, not low level 
CBP officers.70  Congress designed this process in an effort to “protect those 
aliens who present credible claims for asylum by giving them an opportunity for 
a full hearing on their claims,” that is “the same as any other alien in the U.S.”71  
                                                        
 65. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). 
 66. Id. (providing that officers must screen noncitizens flagged for expedited removal). 
 67. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2016).  The noncitizens are asked the following questions: 
[1] Why did you leave your home country or country of last residence? 
[2] Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to your home 
country or being removed from the United States? 
[3] Would you be harmed if you are returned to your home country or country 
of last residence? 
[4] Do you have any questions or is there anything else you would like to add? 
Kuck, supra note 25, at 253 app. A (providing sample Form I-867B: “Record Sworn Statement in 
Proceedings Under Section 235(b)(1) of the Act”). 
 68. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).  A noncitizen has a “credible fear” of persecution if they 
can show a “significant possibility” of establishing eligibility for asylum.  Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) 
(defining “credible fear of persecution” as “a significant possibility, taking into account the 
credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts 
as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum”). 
 69. Noncitizens who are not eligible for expedited removal are placed in formal removal 
proceedings and may raise asylum claims before an immigration judge in an adversarial proceeding.  
See Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., 
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (last 
updated Oct. 19, 2015). 
 70. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 16–17 (1996). 
 71. Id. at 12–13 (“Throughout the process, the procedures protect those aliens who present 
credible claims for asylum by giving them an opportunity for a full hearing on their claims.”); id. 
at 158 (“If the alien meets this [credible fear] threshold, the alien is permitted to remain in the U.S. 
to receive a full adjudication of the asylum claim—the same as any other alien in the U.S.”); see 
also id. at 107–08 (“[A]rriving aliens with credible asylum claims will be allowed to pursue those 
claims.”). 
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Based on these procedural safeguards, Congress was confident that “there 
should be no danger that an alien with a genuine asylum claim will be returned 
to persecution.”72 
2.  The Reinstatement of Removal and Withholding of Removal Provisions 
Prior to IIRIRA, the reinstatement statutory provision applied only to certain 
illegal reentrants—those who were deemed “anarchists” or “subversives”—but 
even those individuals could still seek some discretionary relief.73  Notably, 
however, in the thirty years prior to 1996, this provision was rarely invoked, 
with its last mention in a reported Board of Immigration Appeals decision 
occurring in 1966.74 
Congress resurrected this dormant provision in 1996 with IIRIRA.75  Now the 
reinstatement provision applies to all illegal reentrants, it explicitly insulates 
reinstated removal orders from judicial review, and it bars the noncitizen from 
applying for or receiving “any relief” under the INA.76  Thus, much like the 
expedited removal process, the reinstatement provision streamlines the process 
of removing noncitizens who have already been deemed removable and are 
again unlawfully present. 
While Congress significantly modified the reinstatement provision when 
enacting IIRIRA, it did not substantively alter the withholding of removal 
provision, which it recodified a few subsections below the reinstatement 
provision. 77   As previously noted, withholding of removal instructs that 
noncitizens may not be removed if their life or freedom will be threatened on 
account of a protected ground, subject to limited exceptions.78  This language 
                                                        
 72. Id. at 158 (“Under this [expedited removal] system, there should be no danger that an 
alien with a genuine asylum claim will be returned to persecution.”). 
 73. Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 33–34 (2006). 
 74. Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1040 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that this provision 
had largely “fallen into desuetude,” and citing Matter of Ibarra-Obando, 12 I. & N. Dec. 576 
(B.I.A. 1966) as the last time a published BIA opinion had considered it). 
 75. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (1994), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (Supp. II 1996) provides: 
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United States illegally after 
having been removed or having departed voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior 
order of removal is reinstated . . . and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed, the 
alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief under this chapter, and the alien shall 
be removed under the prior order at any time after the reentry. 
 76. Id.  Congress did not define “relief” in the INA; see also Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 
F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2015) (“The immigration statutes do not define the word ‘relief’”). 
 77. The only revision IIRIRA made to the withholding of removal provision from its original 
form was to add an explanatory paragraph regarding two of the existing exceptions to eligibility. 
Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1980) with 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3) (Supp. II 1996). 
 78. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012) states: 
Notwithstanding paragraphs (1) and (2), the Attorney General may not remove an alien 
to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be 
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership 
in a particular social group, or political opinion. 
626 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 66:613 
mirrors the international law principle of “nonrefoulement,” a principle the U.S. 
is obligated to uphold as a signatory to the United Nations Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees.79  Thus, withholding of removal is the final safeguard 
against nonrefoulement when no other form of relief, such as asylum, is 
available.  To determine if a noncitizen is eligible for withholding of removal, 
Congress instructed the Attorney General to apply the asylum interviewing 
process as outlined in the asylum statutory provision—that is, an immigration 
judge must ultimately evaluate the merits of the withholding of removal claim.80 
3.  The Asylum Provision 
Prior to 1980, U.S. law did not address refugees or asylum seekers.  In 1980, 
however, Congress enacted the Refugee Act of 1980, an amendment to the INA 
that opened the nation’s doors to asylum seekers for the first time.81  In enacting 
the Refugee Act of 1980, “one of Congress’[s] primary purposes was to bring 
United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.”82 
Beginning with the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress has always distinguished 
between which noncitizens could apply for asylum, and those who, although 
they could apply, were nevertheless ineligible for it.  Specifically, beginning 
with the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress placed no limitations on who could 
apply for asylum, but instead, simply instructed the Attorney General to 
“establish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a 
                                                        
Id. 
 79. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999) (“The basic withholding [of the 
removal] provision [codified at 8 U. S. C. § 1231(b)(3)] . . . parallels Article 33 [of the Refugee 
Convention], which provides that ‘no Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of [a protected ground].’”) (quoting Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees art. 33(1), July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150)).  The Aguirre-Aguirre court 
also noted that nearly all the provisions of this Convention, including Article 33, were incorporated 
by reference in the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, which the U.S. acceded to in 
1968.  Id. 
 80. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(C) (2012) (“In determining whether an alien has demonstrated that 
the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened for a reason described in subparagraph (A), the trier 
of fact shall determine whether the alien has sustained the alien’s burden of proof, and shall make 
credibility determinations, in the manner described in clauses (ii) and (iii) of section 1158(b)(1)(B) 
of this title.”). 
 81. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, § 208, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (Supp. IV 1980)); see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 433 (1987) (“Prior 
to the 1980 amendments there was no statutory basis for granting asylum to aliens who applied 
from within the United States.”).  Previously, “asylum for aliens who were within the United States 
had been governed by regulations promulgated by the INS, pursuant to the Attorney General’s 
broad parole authority.”  Id. at 427 n.4. 
 82. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436. 
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land border or port of entry, irrespective of such [noncitizen’s] status, to apply 
for asylum.”83 
Regarding which applicants were eligible for asylum, Congress provided that 
the Attorney General may grant asylum to applicants who meet the definition of 
“refugee.”84  In the definition of refugee, Congress placed one categorical bar to 
asylum eligibility: noncitizens who in any way “participated in the persecution 
of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a 
particular social group, or political opinion” are not “refugees,” and therefore, 
although they may apply for asylum, they would nevertheless be ineligible to 
receive it.85 
In 1990, Congress created the first bar on who could apply for asylum: 
noncitizens with aggravated felony convictions “may not apply for or be granted 
asylum.”86  From 1980 to 1996, the only other amendment Congress made to the 
asylum statute was in 1994, when Congress limited asylum seekers’ access to 
work authorization while their asylum applications were pending.87 
In 1996, Congress passed IIRIRA, which included significant structural and 
substantive changes to the asylum statutory provision.  To begin with, Congress 
redrafted sections 1158(a), “Authority to Apply for Asylum,” and 1158(b), 
“Conditions for Granting Asylum.”  These structural changes reiterated 
Congress’s long-standing delineation between (a) those who could apply for 
asylum and, of those applicants, (b) the guidelines for asylum eligibility.88 
Turning first to who could apply for asylum, Congress divided § 1158(a) into 
two parts.  Subpart (1) is a general rule stating that “any alien . . . irrespective of 
such alien’s status” may apply for asylum in accordance with the asylum 
provision (§ 1158) and the expedited removal provision (§ 1225(b)).89  Notably, 
Congress’s reference to “any” noncitizen appears to be expansive when 
                                                        
 83. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. IV 1980). 
 84. Id. at § 1158(b).  A “refugee” is: 
any person . . .who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 
himself or herself of the protection of, [his home] country because of persecution or a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion . . . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
 85. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
 86. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 515, 104 Stat. 5053 (1990) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) (Supp. II 1990)) (“An alien who has been convicted of an aggravated 
felony . . . may not apply for or be granted asylum.”).  Previously, there were no bars to who could 
apply for asylum.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1982). 
 87. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(e) (1994).  Previously, asylum seekers received work authorization 
automatically upon applying for asylum.  8 U.S.C. § 1522(b)–(c) (Supp. IV 1980) (repealed 1994). 
 88. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994), with Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 604, 110 Stat. 3009-690 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. III 1997)). 
 89. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2012). 
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considering that prior versions of the asylum statute contemplated asylum for 
merely “an alien.”90 
The second part is Subpart (2), titled “Exceptions”; which lists three newly-
legislated exceptions to the Subpart (1)’s general rule that “any” noncitizen may 
apply for asylum.91  These exceptions amount to mandatory grounds for denial 
due to ineligibility and apply when the noncitizen: (A) could be removed to a 
safe third country; (B) failed to apply for asylum within a year of arriving in the 
U.S.; or (C) was previously denied asylum.92  However, Congress also created 
one exception to the second and third ineligibility grounds: (D) if a noncitizen 
establishes changed or extraordinary circumstances, he or she may apply for 
asylum at any time, even after the one-year deadline has passed or after an initial 
asylum application is denied.93  While adding these bars to asylum access and 
the changed circumstances exceptions, Congress simultaneously discarded the 
only pre-IIRIRA bar to who could apply for asylum—the aggravated felony 
bar.94 
Turning to the eligibility for asylum provision, § 1158(b), Congress divided it 
into four parts—three of which are relevant here.  Subsection (b)(1) is the same 
general rule as in prior versions of the INA; it gives the Attorney General the 
authority to grant asylum when an applicant is a “refugee” by definition. 95  
Subsection (b)(2) lays out the exceptions to this general rule and bars the 
following noncitizens from asylum eligibility: noncitizens who participated in 
the persecution of another based on the protected asylum grounds; were 
convicted of a particularly serious crime, which includes aggravated felonies; 
probably committed a serious political crime outside the U.S. or are a danger to 
the security of the U.S.; committed terrorist activities;96 or “firmly resettled in 
another country” prior to arriving in the U.S.97  Subsection (b)(2)(C) provides 
that the Attorney General may create regulations that establish “additional 
limitations and conditions, consistent with this section, under which [a 
                                                        
 90. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994) with 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2012). 
 91. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A)–(D) (2012). 
 92. Id. 
 93. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) states: 
An application for asylum of an alien may be considered, notwithstanding subparagraphs 
(B) [one-year deadline] and (C) [previous asylum application], if the alien demonstrates 
to the satisfaction of the Attorney General either the existence of changed circumstances 
which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or extraordinary 
circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application within the period specified in 
subparagraph (B) [one-year deadline]. 
 94. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2) (Supp. II 1996) with Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 
No. 101-649, § 515(a)(1), 104 Stat. 5053 (1990) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d) 
(1990)). 
 95. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (Supp. II 1996). 
 96. Id.  This is the only instance in the asylum statute where Congress incorporated by cross-
reference an existing ground of removability as a bar to asylum eligibility. 
 97. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2012). 
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noncitizen] shall be ineligible for asylum under [§ 1158(a)(1)]”; that is, who may 
apply but nevertheless may be found ineligible for relief.98 
A final relevant revision IIRIRA made to the asylum statute was the addition 
of § 1158(d)(5)(B): “The Attorney General may provide by regulation for any 
other conditions or limitation on the consideration of an application for asylum 
not inconsistent with this chapter.”99 When compared to prior versions of the 
asylum provision, this is restrictive language.  Previously, Congress placed no 
restriction on the Attorney General’s regulatory authority, and instead, broadly 
instructed the Attorney General to “establish a procedure” for noncitizens to 
apply for asylum.100 
In sum, these revisions all furthered Congress’s goal to reduce the perceived 
abuse of the asylum system, while still maintaining the long-held American ideal 
that America’s doors should never be shut in the face of bona fide refugees.  The 
new restrictions on who could be eligible for asylum would, at least in theory, 
weed out bogus applicants, and even these new restrictions were not absolute, 
since Congress recognized that bona fide applicants may have good reason for 
applying late or even reapplying.  Congress also seemingly broadened who could 
seek asylum by not only ensuring asylum access to “any” noncitizen, but also 
by restricting for the first time what type of regulations the Attorney General 
could promulgate regarding who may apply for asylum. 
4.  The Withholding-Only Regulation 
Although Congress expressly addressed the interplay between the asylum and 
the expedited removal provisions, both by cross-reference and by explicitly 
instructing immigration officers to screen noncitizens flagged for expedited 
removal to determine whether they have indicated a fear of persecution or an 
intent to apply for asylum, Congress made no such cross-references or mention 
relating to the reinstatement provision and the asylum and withholding 
provisions. 
But rather than giving these three statutory provisions full effect, the DHS 
interpreted the reinstatement provision’s bar on “any relief” as trumping the 
asylum provision’s grant of asylum access to “any” noncitizen, subject to the 
three exceptions enumerated in the asylum provision. 101   The DHS further 
interprets the withholding of removal provision’s prohibition on removing 
                                                        
 98. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). 
 99. Id. § 1158(d)(5)(B). 
 100. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994) (repealed 1996) (“The Attorney General shall establish a 
procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, 
irrespective of such alien’s status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the 
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee 
within the meaning of section 1101(a)(42) (A) of this title.”). 
 101. Questions and Answers: Reasonable Fear Screenings, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION 
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-answers-reason a 
ble-fear-screenings (last updated June 18, 2013). 
630 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 66:613 
noncitizens who may be persecuted in their home country as the only protection 
available under the INA to a noncitizen fearing removal.102 
Pursuant to this interpretation, the DHS promulgated regulations mandating 
that noncitizens with reinstated removal orders who fear persecution may apply 
for withholding of removal only.103  This regulatory scheme further provides 
that when CBP believes a noncitizen has illegally entered the U.S., CBP must 
interview the noncitizen to determine their identity and whether they illegally 
reentered after having been removed or voluntarily departed pursuant to a prior 
removal order.104  If so, CBP will automatically reinstate the removal order, and 
“[t]he alien has no right to a hearing before an immigration judge in such 
circumstances.”105 
But, unlike the expedited removal statutory provision and regulation, both of 
which require CBP to issue a referral when the noncitizen merely “indicates” a 
fear of persecution, in reinstatement proceedings, the regulation requires the 
noncitizen to actually “express a fear of persecution”—a more stringent 
requirement—to receive a “reasonable fear” referral. 106   Additionally, CBP 
officers must ask a single, unexplained fear-based question during the 
reinstatement interview, compared to the interview and rights explanation and 
the three fear-based questions mandated in the expedited removal context.107  
This one question is mandated only by CBP internal policies, rather than by 
statute or regulation.108  And because CBP has not made its current internal 
policies public, it is unclear whether this single question remains part of the 
CBP’s interview requirements.109 
                                                        
 102. Id. 
 103. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e) (2016) (providing that noncitizens who express a fear of removal 
during the reinstatement of their prior order of removal should be referred to an asylum officer to 
determine whether the noncitizen has a “reasonable fear” of persecution or torture); see also id. § 
1208.31 (providing how adjudicators are to process “reasonable fear” claims made during 
reinstatement of removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(5)). 
 104. Id. § 241.8(a)(1)–(3). 
 105. See id.; see also Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
under the former regulation, the noncitizen had the right to appeal an adverse decision to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals and ultimately to the federal courts of appeal). 
 106. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e). 
 107. See Memorandum from John P. Torres, Acting Dir. of the Office of Det. and Removal 
Operations, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t to Field Office Dirs., § 14.8(b)(2) (Mar. 27, 2006), 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/dro_policy_memos/09684drofieldpolicymanual.pdf (updating 
CBP’s 2006 Instructor’s Field Manual with instructions on reinstatement of removal proceedings, 
including the requirement that interviewing CBP officers ask the noncitizen, “[d]o you have any 
fear of persecution or torture should you be removed from the United States?”). 
 108. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (Supp. II 1996); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e). 
 109. See AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNSEL, CBP RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL 1 
n.4 (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/foia_documen 
ts/access_to_counsel_cbp_foia_factsheet.pdf (stating “the Inspector’s Field Manual (IFM) . . . has 
been replaced by the electronic Officer Reference Tool (ORT).  Since the ORT is not publicly 
available, it is unclear what guidance is currently in use.  CBP’s Office of Field Operations has 
recognized that CBP officers are still using the IFM as a ‘reference,’ but stated that the officers 
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Ultimately, if CBP officers ask this question and the noncitizen answers 
affirmatively, the regulation requires CBP to refer them to a “reasonable fear” 
interview, the first step in applying for withholding of removal, rather than a 
“credible fear” interview, the standard for asylum.110  If, however, the noncitizen 
does not express a fear of persecution, the noncitizen is immediately removed 
pursuant to an unreviewable reinstated removal order.111 
C. The Outcome: The Statutory and Regulatory Scheme in Practice 
Based on the withholding-only regulation, “countless” noncitizens have fled 
persecution and have been denied the opportunity to apply for asylum in the U.S. 
based solely on their reinstated removal order.112  This includes individuals who 
were errantly removed through the expedited removal process because the 
interviewing CBP officer did not inquire about the noncitizen’s fear of 
persecution prior to entering the removal order.  One such person is Yesenia, 
who, like Emely, is gay; and after being forced to marry a sixty-four-year-old 
man who drugged, raped, and impregnated her as a “cure” for her sexual 
orientation when she was only fourteen years old, she fled El Salvador.113  When 
she arrived in the U.S., CBP placed her in expedited removal proceedings and, 
without ever asking about her fear of removal, quickly deported her.114  When 
she fled to the U.S. a second time, her prior removal order was reinstated, but 
before deporting her, the CBP officer asked about her fear of removal; she 
responded by expressing her fears and as a result, she was then placed in 
withholding-only proceedings. 115   Yesenia appealed her placement in 
withholding-only proceedings all the way to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
arguing she had the right to apply for asylum under the INA; however, prior to 
the Ninth Circuit’s consideration of this argument, the DHS agreed to allow 
Yesenia to apply for asylum, thereby settling the appeal in February 2014.116 
                                                        
should be using ‘current guidance and policy issued by HQ.’”).  Notably, Emely’s A-file states that 
she was asked this fear-based question and answered “no.”  However, she claims she was never 
asked about her fear of persecution.  See supra note 1. 
 110. Compare, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e) (mandating that in reinstatement of removal screening, 
noncitizens expressing a fear of removal are to be referred to an asylum officer for a “reasonable 
fear” interview), and id. § 1208.31(a) (same), with id. § 235.3(b)(4) (establishing procedures for 
referrals to “credible fear” interviews), and id. § 208.30 (same), and id. § 1208.30 (same). 
 111. Id. § 241.8(a). 
 112. See Brief for American Immigration Lawyers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 2, Perez-Guzman v. Holder, No. 13-70579 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2014) [hereinafter AILA 
Amicus Brief] (“Amici are aware of countless individuals facing the same problem.”). 
 113. Brief for Center for Gender & Refugee Studies et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 11–13, Maldonado Lopez v. Holder, No. 12-72800 (9th Cir. June 6, 2013). 
 114. Id. at 3. 
 115. See id. at 24 n.20. 
 116. Id. at 3; see also Order of Dismissal, Maldonado Lopez v. Holder, No. 12-72800 (9th Cir. 
Feb. 4, 2014), EFC No. 41 (granting parties’ joint motion to dismiss petition for review). 
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Like Emely and Yesenia, Rony Guzman fled to the U.S. twice, fearing for his 
life after he was targeted for death for testifying against a gang member in 
Guatemala, in addition to being kidnapped and beaten by the police.117  Yet CBP 
errantly removed him through an expedited removal order without inquiring 
about his fear of persecution.  When he returned, CBP reinstated his prior order, 
but this time also referred him to a reasonable fear interview based on his 
expression of fear. 118   Like Yesenia, Rony appealed his placement in 
withholding-only proceedings to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the withholding-
only regulation conflicts with the INA.119  The Ninth Circuit recently issued a 
decision in his case that created a circuit split with the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ 2015 decision—the only other opinion on this issue. 120   These 
decisions are discussed below in Part II. 
The withholding-only regulation also bars noncitizens from applying for 
asylum even when the persecution they endured occurred after their initial 
removal from the U.S.121  “Mirabel’s” is one such case.  In 2001, she was 
removed from the U.S. to Honduras, and “subsequently became romantically 
involved with an abusive man,” who “confined her to her home, raped her 
[repeatedly], and even allowed his friends to gang rape her.”122  When she fled 
to the U.S., Mirabel’s prior order of removal was reinstated, barring her from 
applying for asylum based on these events, all of which occurred after her 2001 
order of removal was entered.123 
Like Mirabel, the persecution compelling “David,” who is transgender, to flee 
Honduras occurred after the DHS removed her from the U.S. 124   She 
subsequently fled the violence against sexual minorities in Honduras; however, 
CBP deported her again without inquiring about her fear of persecution, this time 
pursuant to a reinstated removal order. 125   After her second deportation to 
Honduras, “she was shot in the face for being transgender and lost an eye.”126  
She then fled to the U.S. for the second time (her third entry), and was placed in 
withholding-only proceedings based on her expression of fear, unable to apply 
for asylum based on a removal order that occurred prior to her persecution.127 
                                                        
 117. AILA Amicus Brief, supra note 112, at 1. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 2. 
 120. See Perez-Guzman v. Holder, 835 F.3d 1066, 1074 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied, No. 13-
70579 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2017), EFC No. 130 (pending petition for a writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 121. AILA Amicus Brief, supra note 112, at 2–3. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 3–4. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 4. 
 127. Id. 
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Furthermore, immigration advocates have reported that CBP reinstates 
removal orders when the noncitizen merely seeks entry without valid travel 
documents, rather than when the noncitizen illegally reenters, the only 
circumstance that by statute should trigger the reinstatement provision.128  Thus, 
the withholding-only provision creates a vicious reinstatement-of-removal cycle 
that puts noncitizens fleeing persecution seriously at risk of being harmed or 
killed.129 
The familiar Chevron framework governs the analysis of whether this 
withholding-only regulatory scheme is valid; this analysis, along with the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits’ recent interpretations of the INA on this issue, is explored 
below. 
II. PUTTING THE WITHHOLDING-ONLY REGULATORY SCHEME TO THE 
CHEVRON TEST 
Under the Supreme Court’s familiar holding in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the validity of an agency’s regulation 
is governed by a two-step inquiry.130  Under Chevron step one, the reviewing 
court asks whether Congress has clearly and unambiguously spoken to the 
question at issue.131  If it has, the court then determines whether the regulation 
comports with Congress’s clear intent.132  If, however, the court determines the 
statute is silent or ambiguous regarding the specific question at issue, the 
reviewing court moves to Chevron step two and asks whether the regulation is 
based on a permissible, reasonable interpretation of the statute; an agency’s 
unreasonable, manifestly unjust interpretations will not stand. 133   Here, the 
withholding-only regulatory scheme fails under both Chevron inquiries.134 
                                                        
 128. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012). 
 129. See Sibylla Brodzinsky & Ed Pilkington, U.S. Government Deporting Central American 
Migrants to Their Deaths, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 12, 2015, 8:57 AM), https://www.theguardian. 
com/us-news/2015/oct/12/obama-immigration-deportations-central-america (reporting, “The U.S. 
government is deporting undocumented immigrants back to Central America to face the imminent 
threat of violence, with several individuals being murdered just days or months after their return . . 
. ,” and as many as eighty-three people killed after their deportation since 2014); see also Brad 
Wong, Domestic Violence Survivor Killed by Ex-Boyfriend After Deportation to Mexico, Lawsuit 
Says, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2013/06/25/domestic-violence-deportation_n_3499117.html (reporting that according to court 
documents, CBP forcibly removed Laura, a twenty-two-year-old mother of three, over her tearful 
pleas for refuge in the U.S. from her violent former boyfriend.  Five days after her removal, “her 
former boyfriend abducted her and took her to a hotel . . . . Later, her body was found in a burning 
car.”). 
 130. 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Only federal appellate courts have jurisdiction to review agency regulations.  See Matter 
of Akram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 874, 880 (B.I.A. 2012) (finding the immigration judge and BIA are 
bound to agency regulations).  Federal appellate courts review issues of statutory interpretation and 
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A. Has Congress Clearly and Unambiguously Spoken to Who May Not Apply 
for Asylum? 
To determine whether Congress has clearly and unambiguously spoken to 
who cannot apply for asylum, a court must analyze the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the statutory language, read in the context of the overall statutory 
structure, subject matter, historic context, and legislative history—all of which 
“help courts determine a statute’s objective and thereby illuminate its text.”135  
Courts also employ traditional canons of statutory interpretation as guides.136 
1. Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch 
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit addressed this issue—an issue of first impression 
among all circuits at the time—in Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch.137  There, the court 
found that Congress had spoken to the question at issue in the INA,138 and held 
that the plain language of § 1231(a)(5), the reinstatement-of-removal provision, 
bars noncitizens with reinstated orders from “all relief from removal, even 
asylum” under § 1158, the asylum provision.139  In reaching this holding, the 
court’s analysis focused on two words in the reinstatement provision: “any” and 
“relief.”140 
Regarding “relief,” the court found that Congress did not define this term in 
any immigration law, including in the INA; consequently, the court looked to 
Black’s Law Dictionary, which generally defines “relief” as “encompass[ing] 
any ‘redress or benefit’ provided by a court.”141  The court also noted that courts 
commonly use the phrase “asylum relief,” compared to withholding of removal 
“protection.”142 Based on this analysis, the court found that asylum is a form of 
                                                        
construction de novo.  Padash v. INS, 358 F.3d 1161, 1168 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We review questions 
of law regarding the INA de novo.”); Socop-Gonzalez v. INS, 272 F.3d 1176, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“We review de novo . . . the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality Act” (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
 135. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1998). 
 136. See id. at 228 (explaining that to determine Congressional intent, courts “look to the 
statute’s language, structure, subject matter, context, and history—factors that typically help courts 
determine a statute’s objectives and thereby illuminate its text” (citing United States v. Wells, 519 
U.S. 482, 490 (1997) (applying the “interpretive hierarchy” of statutory canons in order to 
determine congressional intent))); see also Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of 
Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 343 (2010) (explaining that “‘canons of construction’ (also known 
as maxims of interpretation) guide the methods and sources used in statutory interpretation . . . .”). 
 137. 794 F.3d 485, 490–91 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 138. Although the petitioner in Ramirez-Mejia attacked the validity of the withholding-only 
regulation, the court did not conduct Chevron analysis.  Instead, the Ramirez-Mejia court held that 
the statutory scheme alone established the reinstatement bar to asylum, and found the Agency’s 
withholding-only regulation supported that holding.  Id. at 48–91. 
 139. Id. at 90. 
 140. Id. at 489–90. 
 141. Id. at 489. 
 142. Id. 
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“relief” within the meaning of § 1231(a)(5), but that withholding of removal is 
not.143 
Regarding the meaning of “any” relief, the court noted that “[r]ead naturally, 
the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning,” and “[w]hen the word is not qualified 
by restrictive language, there is no basis in the text for limiting the word or clause 
it modifies.” 144   The court also found that a contrary interpretation—one 
allowing noncitizens with reinstated removal orders to apply for asylum—would 
be inconsistent with the reinstatement provision.145  In support of this finding, 
the court reasoned that “Congress has many options in revising statutory 
schemes,” and “[a]dopting a clear limitation in one section [§ 1231(a)(5)’s 
reinstatement provision] without amending another section [§ 1158’s asylum 
provision] specifically dealing with the same subject is one such option.”146  Put 
differently, the court found that the general provision (the reinstatement 
provision) trumped the specific provision (the asylum provision).  As a result, 
the court held that “[t]he clear language in Section 1231(a)(5) suffices to bar all 
relief from removal, even asylum.”147 
At each level, the court’s analysis contained flaws, but the root problem was 
the court’s failure to apply traditional canons of statutory construction, which 
resulted in an opinion that sets bad precedent.  Before addressing the flaws in its 
resolution of the interplay between the asylum and reinstatement provisions, a 
                                                        
 143. Id. at 489–90. 
 144. Id. at 490 (citations omitted). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id.  The court’s understanding of the legislative history of these provisions is misguided; 
as addressed in Part I, Congress amended both sections simultaneously.  This factual 
misunderstanding seriously undermines the court’s statutory interpretation, in addition to the fact 
that the court ignored well-established canons of statutory interpretation, such as the 
general/specific rule.  See, e.g., RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Band, 132 S. Ct. 
2065, 2070–72 (2012). 
 147. Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 490.  The court further reasoned that analogous case law 
supported this conclusion, citing two cases holding that noncitizens with reinstated removal orders 
are not eligible for adjustment of status, a form of “relief.”  Id. at 490–91.  Notably, however, the 
regulation’s validity was not challenged in either of those cases, and therefore in reaching these 
holdings, these courts considered both the regulation and the statute in determining that the 
petitioners were not eligible for adjustment of status relief.  Compare id. at 490 (“The clear 
language in Section 1231(a)(5) suffices to bar all relief from removal, even asylum.”), with 
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35–36 n.4 (2006) (discussing the regulations that may 
be considered when an alien seeks withholding of removal, “[n]otwithstanding the absolute terms 
in which the bar on relief is stated”), and Silva Rosa v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 403, 406 (5th Cir. 2007) 
(finding that the statutory language was unclear as to the “statutes proper reach”).  Ramirez-Mejia, 
conversely, stands for the proposition that the plain language of the INA alone bars asylum relief. 
Interestingly, the DHS’s application of the withholding-only regulation actually undermines this 
plain-language holding.  As cases like Yesenia’s illustrate, the Attorney General has exercised 
discretion in applying the § 1231(a)(5) reinstatement bar, and allowed a noncitizen to apply for 
asylum despite having a reinstated removal order.  Thus, the Agency may not have promulgated 
the withholding-only regulation due to the plain language of the INA, as the Ramirez-Mejia court 
concluded, and if the Agency did, it has since departed from that interpretation of the INA. 
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few preliminary points regarding the court’s analysis of “relief” are worth 
mentioning, as they further illustrate why the application of interpretive canons 
is vital to establishing good precedent. 
First, there is no doubt that a court’s ultimate goal when conducting statutory 
analysis is to determine congressional intent.148  Therefore, when the Ramirez-
Mejia court correctly found that Congress did not define “relief,” the court 
should have next considered how Congress used “relief” in the INA before 
considering secondary sources like the dictionary or colloquial usage.149   Had 
the Ramirez-Mejia court applied this “normal rule of statutory construction”—
that “identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have 
the same meaning”150—it would have found that Congress explicitly refers to 
asylum and withholding of removal as forms of “relief” in several sections in 
the INA.151  This alone undermines the court’s holding, since it looked to the 
dictionary and colloquialisms, rather than Congressional usage, to find that 
“relief” included asylum, but not withholding of removal.152 
Another well-established canon of statutory interpretation succinctly captures 
the court’s other error: “It is a commonplace of statutory construction that the 
specific governs the general.”153  Under this canon, the “general language of a 
                                                        
 148. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 
(1984) (“When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it administers, it is 
confronted with two questions.  First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.  If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for 
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”). 
 149. Canons of interpretation provide that the dictionary's definition or the colloquial uses of 
a word may be indicators of what Congress intended when it used a particular word; however, those 
canons are less preferred in this case, where Congress itself used the word “relief” repeatedly in the 
INA, and therefore deducing its meaning based on these uses is more appropriate when determining 
congressional intent.  See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 (1997) (“[Courts] do, of 
course, presume that Congress incorporates the common-law meaning of the terms it uses if those 
terms have accumulated settled meaning under the common law,” but this canon of interpretation 
is appropriately employed only when “the statute does not otherwise dictate.”); see also Scott, supra 
note 136, at 343. 
 150. See Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 486 (1990). 
 151. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (“There is no time limit on the filing of a motion 
to reopen if the basis of the motion is to apply for relief under sections 1158 [asylum] or 1231(b)(3) 
[withholding of removal] of this title. . . .” (footnote omitted)).  Moreover, as a general rule, 
Congress uses the term “relief” in the INA to reference mandatory benefits, such as withholding of 
removal, see id. § 1229a(c)(4)(A), and discretionary benefits, such as cancellation of removal, see 
§ 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) (cross-referencing § 1229b(a)). 
 152. See Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 489 (noting that courts commonly refer to asylum as 
“asylum relief” and withholding of removal as “forms of protection,” as support for its holding that 
Congress intended to bar asylum relief, but not withholding protection (emphasis added)).  
However, this conclusion and reasoning ignores conflicting precedent. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-
Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419–20 (1999) (referring to asylum and withholding of removal as forms 
of “relief”). 
 153. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2071 (2012) 
(quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)). 
2017] Forever Barred 637 
statutory provision, although broad enough to include it, will not be held to apply 
to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment.”154  
“The general/specific canon is perhaps most frequently applied to statutes,” like 
the one at issue here, “in which a general permission or prohibition is 
contradicted by a specific prohibition or permission.” 155   To eliminate the 
contradiction, the Supreme Court instructs that the specific provision should be 
construed as “an exception to the general one.” 156   This not only avoids 
contradiction, but also “the superfluity of a specific provision that is swallowed 
by the general one, ‘violating the cardinal rule that, if possible, effect shall be 
given to every clause and part of a statute.’”157 
Had the Ramirez-Mejia court applied these and other axiomatic rules of 
statutory construction, it would have reached a different result—one that would 
allow “any” noncitizen to apply for asylum, even noncitizens whose removal 
orders were reinstated.  For example, as acknowledged in Ramirez-Mejia, the 
“general” provision is § 1231(a)(5), the reinstatement provision; it applies to 
noncitizens with reinstated orders of removal, and bars them from applying for 
“any relief.” 158   By contrast, the asylum provision, § 1158, “specifically” 
addresses who may and may not seek one particular form of “relief”—asylum.159  
However, in § 1158’s list of exceptions to its broad grant of who may apply for 
asylum—“any alien,” “irrespective of such alien’s status”—Congress neither 
cross-referenced nor mentioned the reinstatement bar.160   Section 1158 also 
includes a provision allowing for multiple asylum applications based on changed 
country conditions.161  Thus, to resolve the conflict between these provisions, 
                                                        
 154. Id. (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id.; see also FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) 
(explaining that the canon to resolve ambiguities so as not to conflict with each other, as 
incorporated above, is based on the presumption that Congress intended to create “a symmetrical 
and coherent regulatory scheme”). 
 157. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 2071 (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. 
Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)). 
 158. Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d 485, 490 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Congress has many options in 
revising statutory schemes.  Adopting a clear limitation in one section [§ 1235(a)(5)] without 
amending another section specifically dealing with the same subject [§ 1158] is one such option.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 159. Id. 
 160. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)–(b) (2012).  This is particularly relevant considering (a) that Congress 
crafted the two provisions simultaneously and (b) also while crafting §§ 1231 and 1158, Congress 
incorporated by cross-reference terrorism-related grounds for inadmissibility as an exception to 
who may be granted asylum.  See id. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v).  Thus, the fact that Congress did not 
mention or even incorporate by cross-reference § 1231(a)(5)’s bar on relief, yet it did so with other 
grounds, further supports the conclusion that Congress intended § 1158 to be an exception to 
§ 1231(a)(5)’s general bar on relief. 
 161. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D).  This shows that Congress necessarily intended that an applicant, 
having previously been denied asylum, and therefore also having previously been subject to a final 
order of removal and likely removed pursuant to it, would be permitted to re-apply for asylum.  It 
follows, therefore, that Congress was cognizant that noncitizens with prior orders of removal would 
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courts should construe § 1158 as an exception to § 1231(a)(5) to resolve this 
contradiction between § 1231(a)(5)’s general prohibition on who may apply for 
“any relief” and § 1158’s rules on who may apply specifically for “asylum.”  
This reading of the statute avoids violating the “cardinal rule” of statutory 
interpretation.  It gives effect to every clause of the INA, including 
§ 1158(a)(2)(D), the statutory provision allowing for successive asylum 
applications, which contrary interpretations of the statute—like the Ramirez-
Mejia court’s and the Agency’s—allow to be swallowed up by § 1231(a)(5).162 
Other well-established canons of statutory interpretation lead to the same 
interpretation. For example, when Congress expressly legislates exceptions to a 
general rule as it did here, canons of interpretation encourage courts to narrowly 
construe the exceptions, rather than creating additional exceptions to those 
Congress listed in the statute.163  Here, in § 1158(a)(2), titled “Exceptions,”164  
Congress expressly legislated three exceptions to § 1158(a)(1)’s general rule 
regarding who may apply for asylum, and therefore the Ramirez-Mejia and the 
DHS interpretations that the reinstatement of removal provision established a 
fourth exception is discouraged.165  Similarly, the ancient expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius canon advises that Congress’s express mention of one thing—
here, three exceptions—excludes all others, including the reinstatement of 
removal provision.166 
Interpreting the asylum provision as an exception to the reinstatement 
provision not only resolves the potential conflict created by the two provisions, 
but also resolves the conflict the Agency and Ramirez-Mejia court’s 
interpretations create with U.S. obligations under international law.  Under the 
centuries-old “Charming Betsy” canon of statutory interpretation, federal law 
“ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
                                                        
apply for asylum, yet Congress did not incorporate the § 1235(a)(5) reinstatement bar by cross-
reference or any other method in § 1158. 
 162. See Ramirez-Mejia, 794 F.3d at 490–91; but cf. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2071 (“[T]he canon avoids not contradiction but the superfluity of a specific provision that 
is swallowed by the general one, violating the cardinal rule that, if possible, effect shall be given to 
every clause and part of a statute.”). 
 163. United States v. Smith, 499 U.S. 160, 167 (1991) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates 
certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the 
absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” (quoting Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 
U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980))); see also Scott, supra note 136, at 363 (“Interpreters are cautioned to 
read [exceptions] narrowly,” and “not to create exceptions in excess of those specified by the 
legislature.” (footnote omitted)). 
 164. “Titles are generally not viewed as part of the statute because in old English practice, the 
legislature did not provide them.”  Scott, supra note 136, at 363.  U.S. legislators, by contrast, do 
provide the titles, and therefore “titles are not law, but they are not banished from interpretive 
significance.”  Id. 
 165. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Ventas, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1156, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Where Congress 
includes certain exceptions in a statute, the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius presumes 
that those are the only exceptions Congress intended.”). 
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construction remains.”167  This canon is especially compelling here because 
Congress’s express purpose in enacting the Refugee Act of 1980 was to bring 
U.S. law into conformance with its obligations under the United Nations 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Protocol).168  For example, the 
Protocol requires the U.S. to provide documented refugees or asylum seekers 
with certain benefits, such as the right to travel internationally.169  But under 
U.S. law, noncitizens granted withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3) are not 
permitted to travel abroad, while those granted asylum are.170  Therefore, a 
noncitizen who would otherwise meet the lower burden of establishing they are 
a “refugee,” but who is permitted to seek only withholding of removal due solely 
to the DHS’s current interpretation of the INA, is effectively denied a protection 
that the U.S. is obligated to provide under the Protocol.171  This interpretation is 
not only contrary to the guidance of numerous canons of interpretation, but it 
also contrary to binding precedent, since an alternative, non-conflicting statutory 
construction is available.172 
Based on these canons of statutory interpretation, in addition to the 
considerations addressed below, the Ramirez-Mejia court should have 
concluded that Congress has spoken to the question at issue: subject to only the 
three exceptions in the asylum provision, “any” noncitizen may apply for 
asylum, including those noncitizens with reinstated removal orders. 
2.  Perez-Guzman 
In 2016, the Ninth Circuit became the second circuit court to address the 
interplay between the asylum and reinstatement provisions. 173   Though for 
                                                        
 167. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804). 
 168. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from 
the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that 
one of Congress’[s] primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance 
with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United 
States acceded in 1968.” (citation omitted)). 
 169. Convention for the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 21, 1967, 19 
U.S.T. 6223 (adopting the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which 
outlines the protocol for “Travel Documents” in article 28). 
 170. See 8 C.F.R. § 223.1 (2016) (permitting “refugee travel documents” for only noncitizens 
granted asylum or refugee status); id. § 241.7 (providing that any departure after successfully 
applying for withholding of removal constitutes “self-removal,” and must therefore apply to 
reenter). 
 171. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding the applicant had 
failed to meet the lower burden of establishing asylum eligibility and therefore also failed to 
establish more stringent standard of withholding eligibility). 
 172. See, e.g., Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. at 118 (“It has also been observed that an act 
of Congress ought never be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral 
commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.”). 
 173. Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied, No. 13-70579 (9th 
Cir. Apr. 26, 2017), EFC No. 130 (pending petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court). 
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different reasons than those of the Ramirez-Mejia court, the Perez-Guzman court 
reached the same conclusion: the reinstatement of a removal order bars a 
noncitizen from seeking asylum. 174   But as thorough as the Perez-Guzman 
court’s opinion is, the court still made significant legal errors that led to an 
incorrect conclusion. 
Under Chevron step one, the court found that Congress has not directly spoken 
to the issue of whether asylum is available to a noncitizen who is subject to a 
reinstated removal order.  Instead, the court found that the reinstatement and 
asylum provisions are “in conflict.”175  Before addressing the court’s Chevron 
analysis, it should first be noted that it is unclear whether Chevron even applies 
to a statutory conflict.  That is, as a split U.S. Supreme Court recently discussed, 
it is clear that Chevron applies when the statutory scheme at issue is silent or 
creates an ambiguity.176  In those cases, courts often find deference is owed to 
the agency “because [courts] presume that Congress intended to assign 
responsibility to resolve the [silence or] ambiguity to the agency.”177  But, as 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito recently observed,178 a direct 
conflict in a statute is not an “ambiguity” that triggers Chevron: “Direct conflict 
is not ambiguity, and the resolution of such a conflict is not statutory 
construction but legislative choice.  Chevron is not a license for an agency to 
repair a statute that does not make sense.”179  Thus, given that the Perez-Guzman 
court found these statutory provisions created a direct conflict, not an ambiguity 
or silence, the court arguably should not have applied Chevron to begin with.180 
Turning to the court’s Chevron analysis, the court applied only one canon of 
statutory interpretation, the general-specific canon.181  The court found that both 
provisions spoke specifically to two subsets of individuals—asylum seekers and 
individuals with reinstated removal orders—but that neither provision 
                                                        
 174. Id. at 1082. 
 175. Id. at 1076.  Notably, the court refered to the interplay between the two provisions as 
creating both an “ambiguity” and a “conflict,” yet it ultimately concluded that Congress was silent 
regarding the ultimate question at issue, whether asylum is available to noncitizens with reinstated 
removal orders.  Id. at 1077. 
 176. See Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2214 (2014) (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, 
J., concurring in judgment) (plurality opinion). 
 177. Id. 
 178. See id. at 2216 (Alito, J., dissenting) (plurality opinion) (quoting Chief Justice Roberts’ 
concurring opinion). 
 179. Id. at 2214 (Roberts, C.J. & Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (plurality opinion) 
(emphasis added) (Justices Kagan, Kennedy, and Ginsburg found the statutory conflict was 
Chevron-eligible; the remaining three Justices did not take a position on this issue.). 
 180. See, e.g., Petition for Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Perez-Guzman v. Lynch 
at 10–11, No. 13-70579 (9th Cir. Nov. 16, 2016), EFC No. 101 (arguing that because Chevron 
“relies on the premise that Congress intentionally delegated authority to an agency . . . . If statutes 
conflict, that means Congress did not delegate, it blundered.”  And therefore, “[w]hen faced with a 
true statutory conflict between two unambiguous statutes, the Court should not defer to the 
agency.”). 
 181. Perez-Guzman, 835 F.3d at 1075–76. 
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contemplated subsets of individuals who met both conditions—noncitizens with 
reinstated removal orders seeking asylum.182  Consequently, the court concluded 
the general-specific canon “does not help to clearly discern Congress’s intent as 
to which section should take precedence here.”183 
The court also found the legislative history of the INA did not resolve the 
ambiguity created by the two provisions. 184   The court considered the 
amendments of the INA, including those enacted through IIRIRA, as essentially 
a tie: they “show Congress intended to add more detail to the existing asylum 
scheme while simultaneously expanding the scope and consequences of the 
reinstatement of an earlier removal order.”185  And after finding neither party 
presented legislative materials, the court concluded “the legislative history is 
‘silent on the precise issue before us.’”186  Consequently, the court moved to 
Chevron step two analysis.187 
But had the Perez-Guzman court applied the numerous other canons of 
statutory interpretation available to it, its conclusions would have been different.  
To begin with, the court was unable to determine whether the asylum provision’s 
grant of access to asylum to “any” noncitizen (save the three enumerated 
exceptions), generally or specifically addressed noncitizens with reinstated 
removal orders seeking asylum.  But the application of the expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius canon—the express mention of one thing excludes all others—
would have guided the court to find that the asylum provision is the “specific” 
provision that should control: the asylum provision expressly mentions three 
exceptions to asylum access, and therefore, all other exceptions, including the 
reinstatement provision, are excluded.188 
Similarly, the court did not apply the Charming Betsy doctrine, which 
instructs courts to resolve statutory ambiguity in a way that avoids violating 
international law, including our treaty obligations under the Refugee Protocol, 
whenever possible.189  But rather than resolving the ambiguity in a way that 
preserves the asylum provision, which codifies the U.S.’s obligations under the 
Refugee Protocol, the court “adopted an agency interpretation that violates 
[those] treaty obligations by penalizing refugees based [solely] on their unlawful 
entry or presence,” which the U.S., as a party to the Refugee Protocol, is 
                                                        
 182. Id. at 1076. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 862 
(1984)). 
 187. Id. at 1077. 
 188. See Ventas, Inc. v. United States, 381 F.3d 1156, 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 189. See Brief for Legal Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9–11, Perez-
Guzman v. Lynch, No. 13-70579 (9th Cir. Nov. 28, 2016) [hereinafter Legal Scholars Amicus 
Brief], EFC No. 102-2.  The esteemed legal scholars of this amicus brief are Professor James C. 
Hathaway, Professor Deborah Anker, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean Kevin R. Johnson, Professor 
Hiroshi Motomura, Professor Karen Musalo, and Professor Victor C. Romero. 
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prohibited from doing.190  Had the court applied the Charming Betsy doctrine, it 
would have resolved this tension in a way that preserves rather than disrupts this 
country’s treaty obligations. 
Also, contrary to the court’s conclusion that legislative history was unhelpful 
in determining Congress’s intent, IIRIRA’s internal legislative history and the 
statutory amendments of the reinstatement and asylum provisions both compel 
the conclusion that reinstated removal orders should not categorically bar 
asylum access.191  Regarding the amendments to the asylum provision, not only 
did Congress reconstruct the statute by clearly distinguishing who could apply 
for asylum and who was eligible to receive it, but it also added that “any” 
noncitizen, rather than just “a” noncitizen, could apply for asylum, subject to 
three exceptions.192   All three of these exceptions were new, and Congress 
simultaneously discarded the only then-existing bar to asylum access, the 
aggravated felon bar.  Thus, if Congress had intended the reinstatement of 
removal order to serve as a fourth exception to asylum access, it would have 
listed it here when simultaneously amending both the asylum and reinstatement 
provisions.  Also notable is that in the asylum provision, Congress cross-
referenced several other statutory provisions, including the new expedited 
removal provision, yet did not cross-reference the reinstatement provision, 
despite simultaneously amending it to include a bar on access to “all relief.”193  
The court did not consider these amendments in its analysis. 
Also persuasive is the fact that when revising the asylum provision, Congress 
contemplated placing a numerical cap on how many noncitizens could receive 
asylum per year; however, during this process, legislators lamented that not only 
would a cap be contrary to American ideals, but that it would also not solve the 
main problem voters wanted Congress to resolve: illegal entry.194  Ultimately, a 
numerical cap was never enacted.195  Congress also considered, but declined, 
                                                        
 190. Id. at 9. 
 191. See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 419 (2005) 
(“[W]hen a sponsor or committee [of a bill] expresse[s] an understanding of the bill or the mischiefs 
at which it was aimed, federal courts often t[ake] that as probative evidence of the text’s meaning.”). 
 192. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994), with Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 604, 110 Stat. 3009-690 (1996) (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (Supp. III 1997)). 
 193. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012). 
 194. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 517 (1996) (“The admission of refugees to the United 
States is intimately connected to our foreign policy concerns . . . . Legislating a cap on refugee 
admissions would send the wrong message to nations that share the responsibility for the world’s 
refugees and needlessly jeopardize the international system of protection and resettlement of those 
fleeing persecution, torture, and other life threatening situations.” (statement of Rep. Reed)); see 
also id. at 526 (“Some argue that dramatic cuts in legal immigration and protection of refugees are 
supported by the American people.  Unlike this bill[‘s proposed cap on refugee admissions], 
however, voters draw a clear distinction between illegal and legal immigration.” (dissenting views 
of Reps. Conyers, Jr., Schroeder, Jackson-Lee, Berman, Watt, Lofgren, Nadler, Scott, Frank, 
Serrano, and Becerra)). 
 195. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158. 
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creating a categorical bar on asylum applications not filed immediately because 
such a bar would only increase the chances of removing bona fide asylum 
seekers who had legitimate reasons for not voicing their fear of removal 
immediately.196  Ultimately, Congress enacted a one-year deadline for filing an 
asylum application, but even that bar is not absolute if the applicant can show 
changed or extraordinary circumstances for filing an application after the 
deadline.197 
Turning to the legislative history of the reinstatement provision, Congress 
certainly intended this new provision to “toe[] a harder line,” particularly on 
illegal immigration.198  Indeed, Congress and its constituents (incorrectly)199 
believed unlawfully present noncitizens were depleting the finite resources 
available to Americans, such as jobs, public education, and other public benefits, 
and were determined to get this problem under control. 200   Undoubtedly, 
reducing illegal immigration was Congress’s primary purpose for crafting the 
expedited removal provision, which also served a secondary goal of reducing 
the abuse of the asylum process.201  In light of this, the question the Perez-
Guzman court was unable to consider—because it apparently had no legislative 
materials on the record before it—was: how hard a line did Congress intend to 
toe when it enacted the reinstatement provision? 
Considering another congressional goal in crafting IIRIRA—Congress’s 
commitment to the U.S. policy of welcoming and protecting bona fide asylum 
seekers—further assists in interpreting the reinstatement provision and 
                                                        
 196. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 230–31 (noting that some Senators “would have denied asylum 
summarily to anyone who sought to apply for it more than thirty days after entering the United 
States,” but “[i]n the end, the deadline was extended to one year, and exceptions were created not 
only for changed conditions in the applicant’s country, but also for other types of ‘changed’ 
circumstances and for ‘extraordinary’ circumstances.”). 
 197. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). 
 198. See Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 34 (“In IIRIRA, Congress replaced th[e] 
reinstatement provision with one that toed a harder line.”). 
 199. Maria Santana, 5 Immigration Myths Debunked, CNN MONEY (Nov. 20, 2014, 7:12 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/11/20/news/economy/immigration-myths/ (reporting that contrary to 
popular belief, immigrants do pay taxes and Social Security, they are not a drain on the system, nor 
are they taking American jobs). 
 200. 142 CONG. REC. 24,778 (1996) (“In California, our health facilities and our schools have 
been flooded with illegal aliens.  Our public services are stretched to the breaking point.  Tens of 
billions of dollars that should be going to benefit our own citizens are being drained away to provide 
services and benefits to foreigners who have come here illegally.” (statement of Rep. 
Rohrabacher)); see also id. at 24,775 (“As we all know, virtually all [illegal immigrants] are lured 
here by the prospect of jobs . . .” (statement of Rep. Beilenson)). 
 201. See, e.g., id. at 24,777–78 (“One of the things this bill does is to reform the whole process 
of asylum . . . . We have had lots of people coming in here claiming that.  Most of them who claim 
it have no foundation in claim at all.  Once they get a foot in the airport or wherever, they make 
that claim, they get into the system, many of them are never heard from again.” (statement of Rep. 
McCollum)). 
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answering that question.202   This goal to protect asylum seekers was often 
discussed during the creation of IIRIRA; for example, Rep. Jackson-Lee 
commended the progress IIRIRA made in the protection of asylum seekers, 
noting that the U.S. is the leader in providing opportunities for justice, liberty, 
and freedom, and as such, “we should never deny the opportunity for those 
seeking political refuge and needing social justice and fleeing from religious 
persecution.  Our doors should never be closed [to them].”203 
Given this legislative history, it is difficult to believe that the reinstatement 
provision’s “harder line” on illegal entry was intended to categorically bar 
anyone with a reinstated order from access to asylum when—at the same time it 
enacted the reinstatement provision—Congress repeatedly rejected similar bars 
to asylum access, such as the numerical cap on refugees and the requirement that 
asylees immediately request asylum upon arrival, and instead enacted numerous 
measures intended to protect asylum seekers, including the changed 
circumstances exceptions to the one-year bar and prior-asylum-adjudication bar.  
Put differently, it is difficult to reconcile that on one hand, Congress made 
painstaking efforts to ensure asylum seekers have complete access to asylum in 
the asylum and expedited removal provisions, including appellate and 
reapplication rights and exceptions to two of the three bars on access to asylum, 
while on the other hand, simultaneously imposing a mandatory, categorical bar 
to asylum access in the illegal reentry context, even for those who experienced 
persecution after their initial order of removal was entered and have therefore 
never even had a chance to apply.  It is especially difficult to reconcile this when 
applying canons of statutory interpretation, particularly the Charming Betsy 
doctrine and the rule of lenity, which instructs courts to resolve statutory 
ambiguities in immigration law in favor of the noncitizen—not the 
government.204 
Also notable is the fact that Congress explicitly removed the responsibility of 
evaluating fear claims from “low level” CBP officers in the expedited removal 
process; Congress placed this responsibility exclusively with asylum officers 
                                                        
 202. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, pt. 1, at 13 (1996) (“Throughout the process, the procedures 
protect those aliens who present credible claims for asylum by giving them an opportunity for a 
full hearing on their claims.”); id. at 107–08 (“[A]rriving aliens with credible asylum claims will 
be allowed to pursue those claims.”); id. at 158 (“If the alien meets this [credible fear] threshold, 
the alien is permitted to remain in the U.S. to receive a full adjudication of the asylum claim—the 
same as any other alien in the U.S.  Under this system, there should be no danger that an alien with 
a genuine asylum claim will be returned to persecution.”). 
 203. 142 CONG. REC. 24,779 (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee).  Additionally, Rep. Smith, 
echoed this sentiment in an article published less than a year after taking part in crafting and 
enacting IIRIRA, stating: “No aspect of our immigration policy is more closely tied to the history 
and founding principles of our nation than the practice of offering refuge to those suffering political 
or religious persecution abroad.”  Lamar Smith & Edward R. Grant, Immigration Reform: Seeking 
the Right Reasons, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 883, 894 (1997). 
 204. See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (applying the rule of lenity and finding 
that “[e]ven if [a statute] lacked clarity on this point, we would be constrained to interpret any 
ambiguity in the statute in [the noncitizen’s] favor”). 
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and immigration judges.205  Thus, it is extremely unlikely that Congress would 
account for no margin of error regarding some officers’ inevitably errant 
decisions not to refer a bona fide asylum seeker to a credible fear interview, 
which then results in an errant expedited removal order, and then a permanent 
bar to asylum access.206 
All of these considerations show that the Perez-Guzman and Ramirez-Mejia 
courts erred.  The sounder conclusion is that Congress has spoken to the question 
at issue: subject to only the three exceptions in the asylum provision, “any” 
noncitizen may apply for asylum, including those with reinstated removal 
orders.  Alternatively, courts should conclude the reinstatement provision’s bar 
to any “relief” does not include access to asylum.207 
B.  If the INA is Ambiguous, is the Withholding-Only Regulatory Scheme Based 
on a Permissible, Reasonable Interpretation of the Asylum, Reinstatement, and 
Withholding Statutory Provisions? 
Even if a court finds, as the Perez-Guzman court did, that the INA is silent or 
ambiguous regarding whether a noncitizen with a reinstated removal order may 
not apply for asylum, the DHS’s interpretation does not deserve deference 
because it is unreasoned, unreasonable, and leads to arbitrary, manifestly unjust 
results.208  To begin with, the agency has repeatedly maintained that there is no 
ambiguity or silence on this issue; instead, it has asserted that Congress 
expressly spoke to the issue in the reinstatement provision of the INA. 209  
Therefore, Chevron deference to the agency is unwarranted because, as the 
agency concedes, its regulatory scheme did not involve reconciling conflicting 
policies or statutory provisions, nor was it the result of the agency’s unique 
knowledge of implementing immigration laws—the bedrock reasons for 
Chevron deference.210 
                                                        
 205. See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text. 
 206. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (“[Courts] must 
be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely to delegate a 
policy decision of such . . . magnitude to an administrative agency.”). 
 207. See Legal Scholars Amicus Brief, supra note 189, at 16–17. 
 208. See NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 257 
(1995) (noting that regulations must be “reasonable in light of the legislature’s revealed design”); 
Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 120 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he regulation’s effect . . . does not 
‘harmonize with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and purpose.’” (quoting Sekula v. 
FDIC, 39 F.3d 448, 452 (3d Cir. 1994))). 
 209. Perez-Guzman v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1066, 1074–75 (9th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied, No. 13-
70579 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 2017), EFC No. 130 (addressing the government’s argument that Congress 
spoke unambiguously to the issue in the reinstatement provision). 
 210. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) 
(explaining that “the principle of deference to administrative interpretations has been consistently 
followed by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved 
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory policy in the 
given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge respecting the matters subjected 
to agency regulations”). 
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Deference is also not owed because this regulation is the byproduct of the 
agency’s hyper-literal reading of the plain language of only the reinstatement 
provision; it does not take into account the asylum provision, which codified the 
U.S.’s treaty obligation to offer asylum without regard to the noncitizen’s status.  
This is not reasoned decision-making that warrants Chevron deference.211 
Moreover, “[i]t is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the 
statute and yet not within the statute, because [it is] not within its spirit[,] nor 
within the intention of its makers.”212  And as addressed above, not only does 
the withholding-only regulation not contemplate the spirit of the law or 
Congress’s clear intent to protect all bona fide asylum seekers, the regulatory 
scheme actually conflicts with both.  It also creates discord with U.S. obligations 
under international law, and is contrary to the interpretation demanded by 
numerous canons of statutory construction. 
Furthermore, the stories of Emely, Yesenia, Mirabel, David, Rony, and 
countless others illustrate that the regulation leads to absurd, manifestly unjust 
results, and is therefore owed no deference.213  Specifically, Emely, Yesenia, 
and Rony were never given a chance to apply for asylum; they were errantly 
removed through the expedited-removal process—none of them were asked 
about their fear of persecution prior to being deported, despite statutory and 
regulatory rules mandating this inquiry—and when they returned, these 
wrongly-entered removal orders were reinstated, placing asylum protection just 
out of their reach.  Given that Congress made considerable efforts to ensure 
asylum access to those in expedited removal, the regulation, coupled with CBP 
officers’ refusal to comply with the INA, undermines this congressional intent. 
These individuals’ stories also show that the results of the withholding-only 
regulation serve no larger policy goal or reasoned consideration.214  As the 
Supreme Court has found, withholding and asylum serve similar purposes, so 
allowing illegal reentrants access to withholding relief but not asylum is 
                                                        
 211. See Rettig v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 135 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (reversing 
an agency rule because it was not the result of a “reasoned decisionmaking process calculated to 
accommodate the conflicting policies”). 
 212. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
 213. Id. at 459 (“If a literal construction of the words of a statute [lead to an absurd result], the 
act must be so construed as to avoid the absurdity.”). 
 214. See Gila River Indian Cmty. v. United States, 729 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that deference to an agency’s interpretation is unwarranted where the agency 
interpretation was not “a reasonable policy choice for the agency to make”).  Rather, Congress’s 
goal of deterring illegal entry and reentry through summary exclusion methods is directed toward 
inadmissible noncitizens, not bona fide asylum seekers.  See also Martin, supra note 8, at 687 
(noting the policy goals of summary removal methods, such as expedited removal and reinstatement 
of removal, include deterrence, and also “prevents inadmissible aliens from establishing homes, 
employment, and other ties to this country.  This enforcement strategy also makes it easier for the 
individuals [summarily removed] to resume their lives in their countries of origin.”). 
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irreconcilable as a policy goal, as is punishing refugees for illegally reentering 
after being errantly removed in the first place.215 
Cases like Mirabel’s further illustrate the manifestly unjust effect of the 
withholding-only regulatory scheme.  It was after her deportation that Mirabel 
experienced the horrific persecution that caused her to flee; yet, when she arrived 
in the U.S., she was unable to apply for asylum due solely to her prior removal 
order.  And contrary to the Perez-Guzman court’s conclusion, this result is not 
the byproduct of a “difficult policy choice” the agency made.216  Instead, the 
sounder conclusion is that it is arbitrary because it furthers no policy goals: if 
permitted to apply for asylum, Mirabel must still prove her eligibility through 
the same process as in withholding-only proceedings, and therefore the DHS 
must expend the same resources in litigating asylum claims. 
Notably, this regulatory scheme also creates a direct conflict with the subpart 
of the asylum provision that provides for successive asylum applications based 
on changed circumstances.217  Under the withholding-only regulatory scheme, 
however, successive asylum applications are not available to those with 
reinstated removal orders.  Under the same regulation, however, it is available 
to noncitizens who remain in the U.S. in violation of their initial removal 
order.218  The effect, therefore, is to reward those who refuse to comply with 
removal orders by allowing them to reapply for asylum, while punishing 
noncitizens who comply with their removal order and subsequently reenter 
based on new or renewed persecution in their home country.219  This effect is 
untenable. 
Additionally, a court should not give deference to the agency’s interpretation 
because “the agency wrongly believe[d] that interpretation is compelled by 
Congress” when promulgating it. 220   Here, the agency promulgated the 
withholding-only regulation based on a literal interpretation of the INA that the 
agency believed was compelled by Congress; thus, the agency believed illegally 
reentering noncitizens are subject to a mandatory, unreviewable reinstatement 
                                                        
 215. INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419 (1999) (“Under the immigration laws, 
withholding is distinct from asylum, although the two forms of relief serve similar purposes.”). 
 216. Gila River Indian Cmty., 729 F.3d at 1149 (finding that deferring to an agency’s 
“unexplained caveat would permit the agency to sidestep its duty to bring its expertise to bear on 
the ‘difficult policy choices’ it is tasked with making” (quoting Negusie v. Holder, 55 U.S. 511, 
523 (2009))). 
 217. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(C)–(D) (2012). 
 218. AILA Amicus Brief, supra note 112, at 26 (noting that “it makes no sense that [a 
noncitizen] who complied with a removal order in the first instance would be barred from asylum, 
while [a noncitizen] who evaded removal could be considered for such protection, even if only 
when there are changed circumstances”). 
 219. See id. 
 220. Gila River Indian Cmty., 729 F.3d at 1149 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Deference 
to an agency’s interpretation of a statute is not appropriate when the agency wrongly believes that 
interpretation is compelled by Congress” (quoting PKD Labs, Inc. v. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 798 (D.C. 
Cir. 2004)). 
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of removal order and also face a mandatory bar to asylum access.  However, the 
agency also maintains that it may exercise its discretion in reinstating removal 
orders, which allows some noncitizens to apply for asylum despite being initially 
subject to a reinstated removal order.221  Indeed, the agency recently exercised 
that discretion and allowed a noncitizen with a reinstated removal order to seek 
asylum.222  This departure from its previous hard line is strong evidence that the 
withholding-only regulation was premised on the agency’s incorrect belief that 
the mandatory reinstatement created a mandatory bar to asylum access was 
compelled by Congress, a belief the agency no longer maintains and, 
accordingly, no deference is owed to it.  In any event, the agency has issued no 
guidelines for exercising this discretion, which leaves this decision to the 
“unfettered discretion of lower-level officers.”223  Not only does this create 
absurd results, but it also conflicts with clear Congressional intent that such 
weighty decisions are to be made by asylum officers and immigration judges.224 
Finally, a court’s deference to the agency’s interpretation is unwarranted 
because an interpretation that avoids these absurd, unjust results exists—the 
same construction all other considerations point to: allowing any noncitizen to 
apply for asylum, subject only to the exceptions enumerated in § 1158(a).225 
For these reasons, the Perez-Guzman court erred in giving deference to the 
agency’s regulatory scheme. And to avoid that error, other courts finding 
ambiguity or silence in the INA on this issue should not give deference to the 
agency’s interpretation. 
III. FAIRNESS MATTERS: “ANY” NONCITIZEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO APPLY 
FOR ASYLUM 
Even if a court disagrees with the previous Part’s statutory analysis, there are 
still numerous policy reasons for amending the statutory or regulatory scheme, 
thereby allowing noncitizens with reinstated removal orders to apply for asylum.  
Many of these reasons stem from the errors CBP officers routinely make in 
issuing expedited removal orders. These errors often result in CBP issuing errant 
removal orders, which permanently bar bona fide asylum seekers from future 
asylum access. In addition to examining the evidence of these errors, this Part 
also addresses the secondary consequences of these errors, such as how 
immigration judges routinely deny asylum based on adverse credibility findings 
rooted in the inaccurate CBP interview records. Drawing on these problems in 
                                                        
 221. AILA Amicus Brief, supra note 112, at 27–28. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 28. 
 224. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (explicitly delegating the responsibility of 
deciding the fate of those seeking asylum and withholding relief to asylum officers and immigration 
judges). 
 225. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (“If a literal 
construction of the words of a statute [lead to an absurd result], the act must be so construed as to 
avoid the absurdity.”). 
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the expedited removal context, this Part concludes by arguing that in the 
reinstatement of removal process these problems are likely even more rampant, 
given that the reinstatement process has far fewer procedural safeguards against 
the removal of bona fide refugees to situations of persecution. 
A.  Documented Errors in the Expedited Removal Process 
As noted in Part I, when creating the expedited removal process, Congress left 
the delicate first step of screening potential asylum seekers in the hands of CBP 
officers, in addition to granting CBP the unreviewable authority to enter 
expedited removal orders.226   These officers, who are “neither lawyers nor 
judges, . . . hold extraordinary power in determining the fate of arriving asylum 
seekers.”227  But in this same provision, Congress also carved out a critical 
safeguard against the errant removal of bona fide asylum seekers: when 
noncitizens merely “indicate” a fear of persecution or an intention to apply for 
asylum, CBP must refer them to a credible-fear interview, rather than deporting 
them.228 
To comply with this statutory provision, DHS regulations and internal policies 
instruct CBP officers to complete these three steps when interviewing 
noncitizens flagged for expedited removal: 
1.  Read Form I-867A, verbatim.229  This form, a script, advises the 
noncitizen that lying to the CBP officer could result in criminal or civil 
charges or being barred from immigration benefits; that a removal 
order automatically bars the noncitizen from admission for five or 
more years; that the U.S. law protects noncitizens from persecution; 
and that the noncitizen should tell the officer of any fears.230 
                                                        
 226. See discussion supra Section I.B.1. 
 227. Right to Asylum Letter, supra note 27, at 3. 
 228. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (“If an immigration officer determines that an alien . . . 
indicates either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer 
the alien for an interview by an asylum officer.”). 
 229. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2016) (“The examining immigration officer shall read (or have 
read) to the alien all information contained on Form I-867A.”). 
 230. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., Form I-867A (1997) advises: 
U.S. law provides protection to certain persons who face persecution, harm or torture 
upon return to their home country.  If you fear or have a concern about being removed 
from the United States or about being sent home, you should tell me so during this 
interview because you may not have another chance.  You will have the opportunity to 
speak privately and confidentially to another officer about your fear or concern.  That 
officer will determine if you should remain in the United States and not be removed 
because of that fear. 
See Kuck, supra note 25, at 252 app. A (providing sample of Form I-867A).  Notably, like Emely, 
many asylum seekers have had only a few years of elementary school education at the most; thus, 
even if CBP reads this paragraph to the noncitizen, it is unlike the noncitizen will meaningfully 
comprehend it. 
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2.  Ask the noncitizen the following questions from Form I-867B, 
verbatim: 
a.  “Why did you leave your home country or country of last 
residence?” 
“Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to 
your home country or being removed from the United 
States?” 
b.  “Would you be harmed if you are returned to your home 
country or country of last residence?” 
c.  “Do you have any questions or is there anything else you 
would like to add?”231 
3.  Document the noncitizen’s responses, and allow the noncitizen to 
review and revise this record prior to signing and attesting to its 
accuracy.232 
A federal statute, regulation, and the most-recently available CBP guidance 
further instruct that during this screening interview, CBP officers are not to 
evaluate the merits of the noncitizen’s potential asylum claim in deciding 
whether to issue a referral to an asylum officer; that is, CBP officers are to issue 
asylum interview referrals if the noncitizen indicates any fear in any fashion, and 
without weighing the plausibility or credibility of the noncitizen’s fear. 233  This 
                                                        
 231. Id. (providing sample of Form I-867B). 
 232. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (“[T]he examining immigration officer shall record the 
alien’s response to the questions contained on Form I-867B, and have the alien read (or have read 
to him or her) the statement, and the alien shall sign and initial each page of the statement and each 
correction.”); see also Kuck, supra note 25, at 253 app. A (providing sample Form I-867B). 
 233. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (“If an alien subject to 
the expedited removal provisions indicates an intention to apply for asylum, or expresses a fear of 
persecution or torture, or a fear of return to his or her country, the inspecting officer shall not 
proceed further with removal of the alien until the alien has been referred for an interview by an 
asylum officer . . . .”); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER 
PROTECTION, INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL § 17.15(b)(1) (rev. 2006) [hereinafter INSPECTOR’S 
FIELD MANUAL].  The CBP Inspector’s Field Manual mandates: 
[I]f the alien indicates in any fashion . . . that he or she has a fear of persecution, or that 
he or she has suffered or [might] suffer torture, you are required to refer the alien to an 
asylum officer for a credible fear determination. . . . [T]he inspecting officer has a 
responsibility to ensure that anyone who indicates a fear of persecution . . . is referred to 
an asylum officer for a credible fear determination.  Inspectors should consider verbal as 
well as non-verbal cues given by the alien.  The obligatory questions on the Form I-867B 
are designed to help in determining whether the alien has such fear.  Do not ask detailed 
questions on the nature of the alien’s fear of persecution or torture: leave that for the 
asylum officer.  In determining whether to refer the alien, inspectors should not make 
eligibility determinations or weigh the strength of the claims, nor should they make 
credibility determinations . . . . The inspector should err on the side of caution, apply the 
criteria generously, and refer to the asylum officer any questionable cases . . . . Do not 
make any evaluation as to the merits of such fear; that is the responsibility of the asylum 
officer. 
Id. 
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is an essential component of the interview, since most asylum seekers often have 
hidden the source of their fears, such as their sexual orientation or gender 
identity, their entire lives in order to survive, and therefore expecting these same 
individuals to readily disclose this deeply-personal information to a stranger—
especially a government official who just warned them about the civil, criminal, 
and immigration penalties that could arise from their statements—is 
unreasonable and unrealistic.234 
Despite these requirements, however, human rights organizations and 
immigration advocates have consistently reported that “CBP’s processing of 
arriving asylum seekers is marred by careless errors, subversion of even minimal 
procedures, willful indifference, and, in some cases, outright intimidation and 
coercion.”235  These findings are not new, either.  In 2005, the bipartisan U.S. 
Commission of International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) similarly reported 
that CBP was in substantial noncompliance in every aspect of the expedited 
removal screening process, and that these errors were resulting in the errant 
removal of bona fide asylum seekers. 236   USCIRF’s report was based on 
                                                        
 234. Federal courts and legal experts have acknowledged a host of legitimate reasons why 
asylum seekers are hesitant to disclose their fears to CBP.  See Allen Keller et al., Evaluation of 
Credible Fear Referral in Expedited Removal at Ports of Entry in the United States, in 2 REPORT 
ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EXPERT REPORTS 21 n.22 (2005), 
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/ERS_RptVolII.pdf 
(noting reluctance to disclose fear due to “considerable distrust of interviewing officers,” such as a 
belief CBP officers were lying, and CBP officers using “sarcastic” and “demeaning” behavior, in 
addition to “repeatedly” shouting at noncitizens prior to being interviewed); see, e.g., Moab v. 
Gonzales, 500 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2007) (discussing reluctance to disclose sexual orientation); 
Balogun v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 492, 505 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing reluctance to disclose personal 
information); Kebede v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing reluctance to 
disclose rape). 
 235. Right to Asylum Letter, supra note 27, at 10; see also Brief for American Immigration 
Lawyers Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 8, Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 
813 F.3d 240 (5th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-60546) (“Many bona fide refugees are wrongly subject to 
expedited removal upon fleeing persecution and arriving in the United States.”); AILA Amicus 
Brief, supra note 112, at 19 (“Despite Congress’s efforts to ensure asylum’s availability to those 
fleeing persecution, the process frequently fails.”); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “YOU DON’T HAVE 
RIGHTS HERE”: U.S. BORDER SCREENING AND RETURNS OF CENTRAL AMERICANS TO RISK OF 
SERIOUS HARM 5 (Oct. 2014) [hereinafter HRW 2014 REPORT], https://www.hrw.org/sites 
/default/files/reports/us1014_web_0.pdf (“The flaws [in screening for asylum seekers in expedited 
removal] are readily apparent today at the U.S.-Mexico border.”); Letter to DHS Secretary Johnson 
and Attorney General Lynch on Protecting the Right to Seek Asylum, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 
(Nov. 17, 2015, 2:55 PM) [hereinafter Human Rights Watch Letter], https://www.hrw.org/news 
/2015/11/17/letter-dhs-secretary-johnson-an-attorney-general-lynch-protecting-right-seek-asylum 
(“Well-documented deficiencies, particularly in the expedited removal process, result in protection 
claims overlooked or ignored, all too often deporting asylum seekers back to countries where their 
lives are at risk.”). 
 236. Pursuant to 22 U.S.C. § 6474(a)(2)(A)–(D), USCIRF was to determine whether 
immigration officers carrying out the expedited removal process are: 
(A)  Improperly encouraging such aliens to withdraw their applications for admission. 
(B)  Incorrectly failing to refer such aliens for an interview by an asylum officer for a 
determination of whether they have a credible fear of persecution . . . . 
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hundreds of hours of on-sight observation, the thorough review of numerous A-
files, and analysis of immigration judges’ reasons for denying asylum 
applications. 237   As discussed below, the USCIRF report, along with other 
human rights reports, found that (1) CBP officers are not reading the mandatory 
script during the screening interview; (2) even when noncitizens expressly claim 
a fear, CBP officers refuse to provide credible fear interview referrals; (3) CBP 
officers frequently discourage noncitizens from applying for asylum and harass 
those who do; and (4) CBP officers’ keep inaccurate records of noncitizens’ 
responses, yet immigration judges commonly use these records as a basis for 
denying asylum relief.  Due to these errors, reinstated expedited-removal orders 
should not serve as a bar to asylum access. 
1.  CBP Officers Are Not Reading the Mandatory Script During the 
Screening Interview 
USCIRF found that beginning with the most basic requirement of the 
screening interview, reading a script, CBP was noncompliant.238  For example, 
USCIRF found that CBP officers often failed to read any of the information on 
Form I-867A—including the portion of the form explaining why the officer is 
interviewing the noncitizen; that is, to determine if they have a fear of removal—
and in only 44.1% of the cases observed did CBP officers read the protection-
based paragraph stating that U.S. law protects the persecuted and that this may 
be the noncitizen’s only opportunity to voice such fears.239 
USCIRF further found that this noncompliance directly and “significantly” 
impacted the likelihood of a noncitizen’s chance of moving forward in the 
asylum application process—obtaining a credible fear interview—largely 
because “many [noncitizens] may not understand the purpose of the . . . 
interview and may not realize that this interview is their primary, if not sole 
opportunity to express concerns or seek asylum.”240  For example, when CBP 
officers did read the protection-based paragraph of I-867A (“U.S. law provides 
protection to certain persons who face persecution, . . .”), the noncitizen was an 
                                                        
(C)  Incorrectly removing such aliens to a country where they may be persecuted. 
(D)  Detaining such aliens improperly or in inappropriate conditions. 
22 U.S.C. § 6474(a)(2)(A)–(D) (Supp. V 1999). 
 237. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 3. 
 238. Id. at 13–14, 29–30 (reporting that “[a]lthough reading the I-867A form is a required 
element of every [CBP screening] interview in which Expedited Removal will be applied, we 
observed many cases in which the requisite information was not provided to the alien.  In many 
other cases the alien was simply handed a photocopy containing the necessary information but was 
not read the information or offered any further explanation.”). 
 239. See id. at 14 tbl.21. 
 240. Id. at 28–29. 
2017] Forever Barred 653 
astounding seven times more likely to express a fear resulting in credible fear 
interview referral.241 
Similarly, USCIRF found the likelihood of a credible fear interview referral 
increased significantly with each additional, mandatory, question asked from 
Form I-867B.242  For example, if the CBP officer asked either, “Do you have 
any fear of returning?” or “Would you be harmed if you returned?” the 
likelihood of credible fear interview referral increased from 5.3% (when no fear 
questions were asked) to 8.6%.243  When both fear-based questions were asked, 
the likelihood of referral jumped to 18%.244   And while this data could be 
construed as evidence that these questions are “prompting” noncitizens to claim 
a fear of return, USCIRF concluded otherwise, finding that “there was little 
evidence that [noncitizens] are prompted to claim fear by the I-867 information 
and questions,” since about 63% of the observed individuals “spontaneously 
expressed a fear of returning to their home country during the question and 
answer session or in response to the question, ‘Why did you leave your home 
country or country of last residence?’” (a non-fear based question).245 
Ultimately, this data shows that noncitizens simply do not understand the 
purpose of the screening interview because no one is explaining it to them. These 
noncitizens are then deported under an expedited removal order; in an instant, 
their only chance to seek asylum in the U.S. is gone. 
2.  Even When Noncitizens Expressly Claim a Fear, CBP Officers Refuse to 
Provide Credible Fear Interview Referrals 
CBP officers are required to issue a credible fear referral if a noncitizen 
“indicates” a fear of persecution or intent to apply for asylum.246  However, 
USCIRF found that one in six noncitizens who clearly expressed a fear during 
the CBP screening interview—that is, they far exceeded the “indication” 
threshold—were not given a credible fear referral. 247   Instead, CBP either 
removed them pursuant to an order of expedited removal or allowed them to 
withdraw their application for admission and were then sent home.248  Nearly a 
                                                        
 241. Id. at 13, 17 (finding “[t]he odds of being referred for a Credible Fear interview increased 
seven times when the [four]th paragraph [on Form I-867A] was read to aliens relative to when it 
was not”). 
 242. Id. at 17 (finding “the likelihood of a Credible Fear referral increased with each additional 
fear question asked”). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 21. 
 246. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 247. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 29 (“Even when the alien expressed a fear of return, 
referral for a Credible Fear interview was not guaranteed.  One in six aliens who expressed a fear 
of return [to CBP during the screening interview] were placed in Expedited Removal or allowed to 
withdraw their application for admission.”). 
 248. Id. 
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decade after USCIRF’s report was released, Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
conducted additional field research and found this problem had worsened.249 
Two of the individuals USCIRF observed who expressed a fear of removal 
but were not referred to a credible fear interview were women from countries in 
Central America where rampant persecution is well documented.250  One woman 
spontaneously and tearfully begged the CBP officer to help her because she 
feared her ex-husband.251  The CBP officer responded by warning her that she 
should cooperate or she would be “in trouble.”252  Then, immediately before 
asking her the I-867B fear questions, the officer cautioned that if she made a fear 
claim—even though she already had—she would not see her family for a long 
time.253  The woman ultimately withdrew her application for admission into the 
U.S., but not before the CBP officer noted in her A-file that the woman’s 
response to a question about her fear level was, “[n]ot a real fear.  My ex-
husband does not like me.”254  The second woman claimed a fear, too, however, 
when she asked how long she would be in custody and what would happen to 
her son, the officer responded, “[i]f you say you’re afraid[,] you will go into 
detention for an unknown number of days until you have a hearing,” and that 
she would not be able to contact her son, who did not live in the U.S.255  She, 
too, withdrew her application for admission.256 
In another instance, USCIRF researchers observed a political activist from 
South Asia express a fear that Islamic fundamentalists in his home country 
would kill him if he returned.257  However, after the CBP officer confirmed that 
the man would be detained if he claimed a fear, he retracted his claimed fear.258  
The CBP officer did not refer him for a credible fear interview and he was 
subsequently removed on an expedited removal order.259 
The 2014 HRW investigation also found that CBP repeatedly failed to issue 
credible fear interview referrals despite numerous noncitizens’ explicit 
expression of fear.260  Nearly all of these noncitizens were from Honduras, 
where “rampant crime and impunity for human rights abuses” are continually 
                                                        
 249. HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 5.  To create this report, HRW interviewed thirty-
five Central American migrants in detention in the U.S. or recently deported to Honduras.  All the 
interviewed migrants expressed a fear of return, including those who were deported, many of whom 
“had fear[s] so acute that they were living in hiding, afraid to go out in public.”  Id. 
 250. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 23. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at 24. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. 
 260. HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 21. 
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rising and well documented.261  In spite of this, CBP referred only 1.9% of 
Hondurans in expedited removal and reinstatement proceedings for credible fear 
interviews; the remaining 81% were deported.262  In one instance, 
[a] man who was deported in September 2014 told Human Rights 
Watch that when he informed a Border Patrol officer of the threats to 
his life in Honduras, “[h]e told me there was nothing I could do and I 
didn’t have a case so there was no reason to dispute the deportation. . 
. . I told him he was violating my right to life and he said, ‘[y]ou don’t 
have rights here.’”263 
CBP’s refusal to issue referrals to these individuals, despite the fact that they 
have clearly expressed a fear, is potentially due to CBP’s improper judging of 
the merits of the asylum claim, a job Congress expressly delegated to asylum 
officers and immigration judges.264   USCIRF’s researchers observed that in 
“many of the cases in which fear was expressed during the [CBP] interview but 
no referral was made, the nature of the fear expressed may not have been 
sufficient justification for an asylum hearing,” since, at the time, CBP’s internal 
guidelines instructed that referrals were not required when the noncitizen’s 
expressed fear would clearly not qualify them for asylum.265  This policy, which 
has most likely been abandoned,266 obviously conflicted with the statute and 
regulation’s purpose and statutory mandate that CBP issue a referral if a fear is 
“indicated,” without regard to the type of fear, and necessarily undermines the 
validity of any expedited removal order issued while this policy was in place.267 
                                                        
 261. Id. at 12. 
 262. Id. at 21. 
 263. Id. at 8–9. 
 264. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 22 (reporting that “[i]n many of the cases in which fear 
was expressed during the [CBP screening] interview but no referral was made, the nature of the 
fear expressed may not have been sufficient justification for an asylum hearing”). 
 265. Id. at 20 (noting that the CBP Field Manual indicates that when “the fear would clearly 
not qualify an individual for asylum[, the noncitizen] need not necessarily be referred [to a credible 
fear interview]”). 
 266. In December 2011, CBP posted a redacted copy of the 2006 Instructor’s Field Manual 
(IFM), which contains CBP’s internal policies and procedures.  This IFM clearly instructs CBP 
officers to issue referrals any time a fear is expressed, regardless of the nature of the fear.  See 
INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 233, § 17.15(b)(1).  However, the IFM has since been 
replaced with an electronic Officer Reference Tool, which has not been made public.  See 
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNSEL, CBP RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO COUNSEL 1 n.4 (Oct. 1, 
2014), http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/foia_documents/access_to_ 
counsel_cbp_foia_factsheet.pdf.  And in April 2014, CBP’s Office of Field Operations 
acknowledged that CBP is still using the IFM as a “reference,” so it is unclear what guidance CBP 
is currently using and what its policies actually state.  Id. 
 267. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2012); SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 216 (noting that 
during the drafting of Forms I-867A and B, “INS officials assured the advocates that they were 
well aware that the [CBP] inspectors would not be trained in the nuances of asylum law (e.g., the 
requirement that only five specified grounds for feared persecution, such as persecution on account 
of religion, qualified an alien for asylum).  Therefore, the form did not prompt inspectors to ask 
further questions about the nature of the alien’s fear, and they would not do so.”). 
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Also tending to show that CBP officers are still weighing the merits of asylum 
seekers’ claims is the fact that despite employing a heightened evidentiary 
burden in the asylum interview than the burden of proof in the CBP screening 
interview, asylum officers find credible fears a vast majority of the time: in 
FY2013, 92% of all credible fear interviews ended in a credible fear finding.268  
Although this statistic could show that CBP agents are screening asylum 
applicants exceptionally well, that conclusion is unlikely, especially given the 
data showing that a miniscule number of Hondurans receive a credible fear 
referral despite the ample documentation of ongoing human rights abuses in that 
country,269 and the fact that CBP guidelines do not require any inquiry into the 
nature of the fear, and instead require only an “indication” of a fear, before 
mandating CBP issue a credible fear interview referral.270 
Rather, a more likely conclusion is that CBP officers are issuing referrals 
haphazardly, such as when the officer feels the individual is deserving of asylum 
or when the officer thinks the fear is legally valid. 271   Regardless of CBP 
officers’ motives, the high number of credible fear findings by asylum officers 
strongly indicates that CBP officers have expanded the already immense power 
Congress delegated to them by absorbing the responsibility Congress delegated 
to trained asylum officers and immigration judges, not “low-level” employees 
of the federal government.272  This is not only contrary to Congress’s intent 
when enacting IIRIRA, but also warrants the elimination of the reinstatement 
bar to asylum access. 
3.  CBP Officers Frequently Discourage Noncitizens from Applying for 
Asylum and Harass Those Who Do 
The USCIRF and HRW reports both document that CBP officers commonly 
discourage asylum seekers from applying for asylum at all.273  Recent reports 
                                                        
 268. See Asylum Abuse: Is It Overwhelming Our Borders?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) [hereinafter Asylum Abuse] (stating DHS data shows that 
“USCIS makes positive credible fear findings in 92% of all cases decided on the merits” (statement 
of Rep. Goodlatte, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary)); see also Ana Campoy, Illegal 
Immigrants Seeking Asylum Face a Higher Bar, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 28, 2014, 7:02 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/illegal-immigrants-seeking-asylum-face-a-higher-bar-1411945370 
(reporting that in 2014, asylum officers found a credible fear 63% of the time in the month of July, 
and 83% of the time six months earlier). 
 269. See e.g., HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 8. 
 270. See INSPECTOR’S FIELD MANUAL, supra note 233, § 17.15(b)(1), (providing only that 
“the inspector may ask a few additional follow-up questions to ascertain the general nature of the 
fear or concern” during the screening interview (emphasis added)). 
 271. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 22, 29 (reporting that “some CBP officers make de facto 
assessments of the legitimacy of expressed fears, returning aliens that they perceive to be 
inappropriate and referring those that they perceive as warranting asylum”). 
 272. SCHRAG, supra note 29, at 209 (referring to CBP officers as “low-level” employees). 
 273. See Keller et al., supra note 234, at 23–24 (reporting numerous instances of CBP officers’ 
apparent attempts to dissuade asylum seekers from making fear claims); see also HRW 2014 
REPORT, supra note 235, at 26. 
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confirm that this is an ongoing, worsening problem.274  These tactics ranged 
from possibly deliberate attempts—such as incorrectly telling noncitizens that 
because they entered without inspection, they may not have an opportunity to 
present their asylum case, and telling noncitizens that if they made a fear claim, 
they would be detained for three weeks to a month or more—to blatant refusal 
to allow the noncitizen to apply.275  For example, CBP agents reportedly turned 
away five asylum seekers at the U.S.-Mexico border, telling them to “go away,” 
to “go back to where [you] came from,” and forcing them back into Mexico, 
despite their requests for asylum and despite the fact that they were African and 
Middle Eastern, not Mexican.276  This group returned the next day, and as one 
man tearfully begged CBP agents to allow him to enter, CBP officers handcuffed 
them.277  Their persistence ultimately paid off: CBP referred all five individuals 
to credible fear interviews.278 
USCIRF reported that of the noncitizens CBP encouraged to retract their fear 
claims, CBP subsequently referred two of the men who refused to retract their 
claims to credible fear interviews.279  In CBP’s attempt to persuade the first man 
to retract his claim, the CBP officer stated, “[w]hat you are experiencing is a 
personal problem, not one the U.S. offers people asylum for[.]”280  The CBP 
further stated that if the man did claim a fear, he would be in detention for three 
months, and that “I know for sure you will be deported.”281 To the other man, 
CBP officers described the undesirable characteristics of detention in detail, and 
repeatedly asked the noncitizen if he had a fear of returning, in what USCIRF 
described as an apparent attempt to elicit a different response, since the man had 
already expressed a fear of return.282 
                                                        
 274. Letter from Eight Immigration and Human Rights Orgs. to John Roth, Inspector Gen., 
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. & Megan H. Mack, Officer of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Dep’t of 
Homeland Sec. 1 (Jan. 13, 2017), http://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/ 
general_litigation/cbp_systemic_denial_of_entry_to_asylum_seekers_advocacy_document.pdf 
(reporting individual stories of “numerous adult men and women, families and unaccompanied 
children who, over the past several months, were denied entry to the United States at ports of entry 
along the U.S.-Mexico border despite having asserted a fear of returning to their home countries or 
an intention to seek asylum under U.S. law”); Joshua Partlow, U.S. Border Officials Are Illegally 
Turning Away Asylum Seekers, Critics Say, WASH. POST (Jan. 16, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-border-officials-are-illegally-turning-away-asylum-
seekers-critics-say/2017/01/16/f7f5c54a-c6d0-11e6-acda-59924caa2450_story. 
html?utm_term=.e6e42d4abdc9 (reporting numerous individuals have claimed they have been 
refused entry despite claiming fear in their home countries, which one immigration expert states 
“is happening on a daily basis”). 
 275. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 23–24. 
 276. Id. at 24. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. at 23. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. 
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Similarly, HRW reported that CBP’s interviews were “brief and focused on 
explaining additional consequences of deportation.”283  One migrant woman 
reported that “[a]ll [CBP] said to me was that if I came back they would give me 
six months in prison.”284  CBP told another asylum-seeker, a man who had fled 
Honduras after being shot and seeing his mother murdered by gang members, 
“don’t apply [for asylum], 90[%] of the people who do don’t get it,” and then 
instructed him to sign his removal paperwork, saying, “Fingerprint, fingerprint,” 
repeatedly even though the man did not understand what he was signing.285  
When one noncitizen refused to sign his removal paperwork due to his fear of 
removal, CBP responded by insulting him, detaining him for six days in a frigid 
cell, and waking him every few hours to move him to a different “icebox.”286 
Similarly, USCIRF observed CBP officers use “aggressive or intimidating 
behaviors” toward asylum seekers.287  This included “multiple occasions” of 
CBP shackling noncitizens in expedited removal, CBP telling a Central 
American man that he was a “woman” and a “sissy” who sat “like a girl,” and a 
CBP officer calling a noncitizen a shockingly-profane word in the presence of 
another noncitizen.288 
Given the nature of harm asylum seekers have endured and fled—often 
perpetrated by or with the acquiescence of their government’s agents—these 
tactics employed by a uniformed, armed CBP officer are likely to be extremely 
effective in deterring asylum seekers from asking for protection.289  Based on 
these considerations, the reinstatement of prior removal orders should not serve 
as a bar to asylum access. 
4.  CBP Officers Keep Inaccurate Records of Noncitizens’ Responses, Yet 
Immigration Judges Commonly Use These Records As a Basis For Denying 
Asylum Relief 
In addition to refusing to refer noncitizens expressing a fear of removal to a 
credible fear interview, CBP often fails to make any record of that fear.  For 
                                                        
 283. HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 27; see also Janet A. Gilboy, Implications of 
“Third-Party” Involvement in Enforcement: The INS, Illegal Travelers, and International Airlines, 
31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 505, 514–17 (1997) (noting that when noncitizens arrive on flights that 
make brief stopovers at an airport, CBP would rush through screening interviews so as to not disrupt 
flight schedules and avoid having to find detention space for the noncitizen). 
 284. HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 27. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 27–28 & n.53 (explaining that “‘[i]cebox’ or hielera is how migrants commonly 
refer to Border Patrol detention, in reference to the cold temperatures in the cells”). 
 287. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 26 tbl.5.1 (noting that during roughly 10% of all screening 
interviews, CBP officers raised their voice, interrupted, used sarcasm/ridicule, were demanding, 
and left the room without explanation). 
 288. Id. at 26–27. 
 289. HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 8 (“Uniformed CBP officers are usually armed 
while apprehending migrants; when they interview the migrants a few hours or days later their 
holsters are empty but visible . . . .”). 
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example, USCIRF “found that when CBP officials failed to ask the relevant fear 
questions [from Form I-867B], the official record frequently indicated that these 
questions had been asked and answered, typically containing just the word ‘no’ 
in response to fear questions that had not been asked.”290  Other times, CBP 
officers recorded only a portion of the information the noncitizen disclosed.291  
USCIRF also found that the noncitizen’s signature on these forms as an 
attestation to the accuracy of the record is an inadequate safeguard against 
inaccurate A-file records, since nearly 17% of time, CBP did not even ask for 
the noncitizen’s signature, and when they did, this was usually as an instruction, 
not as an invitation to review the record. 292   For these reasons, USCIRF 
concluded that these administrative records are “deeply flawed,” a conclusion 
several circuit courts of appeals have also reached.293 
Despite this, immigration judges routinely treat these administrative records 
as the noncitizen’s personal statements, rather than as a summary of part of what 
the noncitizen might have said.294  And further compounding the inaccuracies 
made in the record is the fact that the noncitizen’s burden of proof increases at 
each stage of the preliminary screening, culminating at the merits hearing before 
the immigration judge.295  Thus, the level of detail necessary for the noncitizen 
to move to the next screening is far less when before the CBP officer than when 
before the immigration judge.296  Despite this, the DHS and immigration judges 
frequently treat the increase in detail contained in the administrative record as 
                                                        
 290. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 30. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. (“When [noncitizens] were asked to confirm their statements, most [noncitizens] were 
neither asked to read the statements, nor had their statements read to them, but were simply told to 
sign the forms.”). 
 293. Jastram & Hartsough, supra note 32, at 88; see also Qing Hua Lin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 
343, 355 (4th Cir. 2013) (Thacker, J., concurring) (citing cases from the Second, Third, Seventh, 
Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits to show that “the circuit courts of appeals have uniformly held that 
these particular interviews should be carefully scrutinized for reliability before being utilized by 
the fact-finder to evaluate an applicant’s credibility”). 
 294. Jastram & Hartsough, supra note 32, at 67, 88 (reporting that in 56.6% of the cases 
introducing the CBP and asylum interview records, these records were used to impeach the 
noncitizen’s merits hearing testimony). 
 295. Initially, the standard for issuing a credible fear interview is met when noncitizen 
“indicates” intent to apply for asylum or expresses a fear of return.  8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (2016).  
Then, the standard for finding credible fear is met when noncitizen shows “significant possibility” 
of establishing asylum eligibility.  8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012).  Ultimately, the standard 
for establishing asylum eligibility in a merits hearing is met when the noncitizen has a “well-
founded fear” of persecution.  Id. § 1101(a)(42); see INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439–
40 (1987) (holding that a well-founded fear is a “reasonable possibility” that the applicant will be 
persecuted). 
 296. For a helpful comparison of these growing evidentiary burdens, see Jastram & Hartsough, 
supra note 32, at 66 tbl.3. 
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an inconsistency in the noncitizen’s story, which often results in a well-
insulated,297 adverse credibility finding.298 
These compounding flaws have two things in common.  First, they result in 
the errant removal of bona fide asylum seekers, sometimes ending in their death, 
or as in David’s case, being shot in the eye.299  Second, these particular errors 
arise only in the expedited removal and reinstatement of removal context, since 
asylum claims asserted defensively—that is, after being placed in removal 
proceedings—are heard by immigration judges only, and therefore no other 
interviews, be it with CBP or an asylum officer, are part of this process.300 
Due to these errors, reinstated removal orders should not serve as a permanent 
bar to asylum access. 
  
                                                        
 297. Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding immigration judge’s 
credibility findings are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review). 
 298. See, e.g., Jastram & Hartsough, supra note 32, at 68, 87 (finding that in at least 39% of 
cases, immigration judges deny asylum claims based on “deeply flawed” administrative records 
created by CBP and asylum officers, and “[w]here the prior records were cited as an element of the 
decision, protection was almost always denied”).  Indeed, in the Author’s experience representing 
numerous asylum seekers appealing adverse credibility findings, immigration judges routinely pin 
cite the “transcript” of the asylum interview—even though they know this is only a summary of the 
noncitizen’s testimony—in finding noncitizens are not credible and consequently deny their asylum 
and withholding claims. 
 299. See sources cited supra note 129. 
 300. See, e.g., Asylum Abuse, supra note 268, at 49 (explaining that unlike asylum claims 
asserted affirmatively or during expedited or reinstatement removal proceedings, a noncitizen in 
removal proceedings “raises the issue of asylum during the beginning of the removal process.  The 
matter is then litigated in immigration court, using formal procedures such as the presentation of 
evidence and direct and cross examination.” (prepared statement of Ruth Ellen Wasem, 
Immigration Policy Specialist, Congressional Research Service)). 
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B.  With No Statutory or Regulatory Requirement to Inquire About the 
Noncitizen’s Fear of Persecution in the Reinstatement of Removal Interview, 
CBP is Simply Repeating These Errors During the Reinstatement of Removal 
Process 
The errors arising in the expedited removal process also highlight the obvious 
need for more guidance in the reinstatement of removal process, where there is 
no statutory or regulatory requirement that CBP ask any fear-based questions or 
provide an explanation of the interview.301  Thus, even if CBP is following its 
former internal guidance to ask one question regarding the noncitizen’s fear of 
removal, it is unlikely the noncitizen will understand why the officer is asking 
this question since no guidance instructs the officer to explain the purpose of the 
interview.  Consequently, the noncitizen may not divulge these personal details 
to a government official under these circumstances.  Indeed, USCIRF concluded 
that when officers explained the interview’s purpose, noncitizens were seven 
times more likely to be referred to a credible fear interview.302  Furthermore, 
even if CBP officers ask the single question officers may be required to ask, this 
one question is still insufficient given USCIRF’s finding that the more fear-
based questions asked increased the likelihood of an expression of fear.303  Also, 
given CBP’s refusal to issue credible fear referrals even when the noncitizen 
explicitly expressed a fear in the expedited removal context, it is extremely 
likely that this problem also occurs in the reinstatement of removal context. 
Finally, cases like Emely and David’s show that CBP does not always inquire 
about noncitizens’ fear of persecution prior to deporting them.  Emely was raped 
and impregnated by a gang leader for being gay, yet CBP repeatedly deported 
her without ever asking about these events; it was not until her third illegal entry 
that CBP finally asked her about her fear of removal.  Similarly, David, who was 
removed prior to being persecuted on account of her gender identity, was not 
asked about her fear of persecution during her reinstatement interview, despite 
this being her first time seeking protection in the U.S.  Thus, even if CBP is 
required to inquire about the noncitizen’s fear, these cases, coupled with the 
expedited removal data, show that CBP is not complying with that requirement. 
Based on the rampant errors in the expedited removal process and the 
evidence indicating that similar noncompliance occurs in the reinstatement 
process, individuals in reinstatement proceedings should be permitted to apply 
for asylum and be interviewed based on at least the same guidelines that the DHS 
has established for the expedited removal interview. 
                                                        
 301. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8 (2016). 
 302. Keller et al., supra note 234, at 17 (finding “[t]he odds of being referred for a Credible 
Fear interview increased seven times when the [four]th paragraph [on Form I-867A] was read to 
aliens relative to when it was not”). 
 303. Id. at 17–18 (finding “the likelihood of a Credible Fear referral increased with each 
additional fear question asked”). 
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The legislative history and statutory analysis explored in Parts I and II reveal 
that, contrary to circuit court interpretation and the federal regulation, the INA’s 
asylum and reinstatement of removal provisions can be interpreted in a manner 
giving both provisions full effect, thereby allowing any noncitizen, even those 
with reinstated removal orders, to apply for asylum, subject only to the 
exceptions set forth in the asylum provision.  Part III showed that removing the 
reinstatement bar also furthers important policy considerations.  This Part makes 
recommendations tailored to federal and immigration courts, the DHS, and 
Congress that, if followed, would not only further these policy goals, but perhaps 
most importantly, would save the lives of people who have come to the U.S. 
under the most dire circumstances. 
A.  Recommendations for Congress 
Congress should amend the reinstatement provision to reflect that asylum 
seekers, regardless of a reinstated order of removal, may apply for asylum and 
withholding of removal.  In addition to the many reasons addressed in this 
Article and by numerous other experts raising due process concerns regarding 
the expedited removal process, this amendment is especially necessary due to 
the pervasive political environment breeding fear mongering regarding refugees, 
led, no less, by individuals vying to lead the executive branch, and also due to 
the greatest global refugee crisis in history.  Failing to make this amendment 
places lives at stake and allows a message of fear and hate to trample on the core 
American value of protecting those seeking refuge.  Thus, Congress should 
amend the reinstatement provision as follows: 
If the Attorney General finds that an alien has reentered the United 
States illegally after having been removed or having departed 
voluntarily, under an order of removal, the prior order of removal is 
reinstated from its original date and is not subject to being reopened 
or reviewed, the alien is not eligible and may not apply for any relief 
under this chapter, except for relief under section 1158 and subsection 
(b)(3) of this section, and the alien shall be removed under the prior 
order at any time after the reentry. 
Additionally, to further reiterate its commitment to protecting asylum seekers 
and also as a remedial measure for the well-documented errors resulting in the 
errant expedited removal of bona fide refugees, Congress should pass a recently 
introduced bill, the Fair Day in Court for Kids Act of 2016.304  If enacted, this 
                                                        
 304. Fair Day in Court for Kids Act of 2016, H.R. 4646, 114th Cong. (2016) (introduced in the 
House of Rep. Feb. 26, 2016).  Another important remedial measure Congress could take is by 
making the reinstatement amendment retroactive; that is, in addition to amending § 1231(a)(5), 
Congress should also instruct the Attorney General to allow noncitizens who were previously 
barred from seeking asylum due to the reinstatement of their prior removal order to reopen their 
claim for relief and seek asylum pursuant to § 1158. 
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bill would require the DHS to appoint lawyers at the government’s expense to 
represent victims of persecution or torture and other vulnerable noncitizens in 
removal proceedings, in addition to mandating that the DHS give noncitizens 
their nonprivileged A-file records, a right noncitizens in removal proceeds are 
commonly deprived of.305 
Congress should also approve the reallocation of already appropriated funds 
to increase indigent asylum seekers’ access to counsel.306  One such method 
would be creating a pilot pro bono program in areas with high concentrations of 
asylum and withholding claims, through which attorneys are appointed to 
represent indigent applicants in their merits hearings before immigration judges 
and appeals before the Board of Immigration Appeals; these attorneys would not 
be compensated for their fees, but the allocated funds would reimburse them for 
their costs.307  Considering that immigration judges are nearly thirteen times 
more likely to find asylum eligibility in cases where the applicant is represented, 
in addition to the immense stakes in these cases, this program would fulfill 
numerous policy goals while also increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of 
judicial review, and requiring only the nominal expenditure of already allocated 
funds. 
B.  Recommendations for the Agency 
The DHS should undertake rulemaking to allow noncitizens to have access to 
asylum, regardless of a reinstated removal order.  Indeed, a Petition for 
Rulemaking is currently pending with the DHS, and as proposed in that Petition, 
the DHS should amend the regulatory scheme to reflect that noncitizens with 
reinstated removal orders who express a fear of removal are to be referred to an 
asylum officer for a “credible” fear interview, rather than a “reasonable” fear 
interview.308  Allowing asylum access will not place additional burdens on the 
system, since noncitizens claiming fear in reinstatement are already being pre-
                                                        
 305. Id.; see also Dent v. Holder, 627 F.3d 365, 373–74 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the 
government’s failure to furnish noncitizens in removal proceedings with their A-files violates due 
process). 
 306. See also HRW 2014 REPORT, supra note 235, at 43 (“To respect asylum seekers’ right to 
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Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2012), by showing the government, including 
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 308. NAT’L IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CTR. & AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS ASS’N, PETITION 
FOR RULEMAKING TO PROMULGATE REGULATIONS VINDICATING THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO 
SEEK ASYLUM NOTWITHSTANDING REINSTATEMENT OF REMOVAL ORDERS app. § 1–12 (Aug. 7, 
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current regulations). 
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screened by CBP and subsequently interviewed by asylum officers.  Nor will 
allowing asylum access require significant additional government funding, since 
both forms of relief offer similar government benefits.  Allowing asylum access 
will actually help conserve the DHS’s limited resources, such as by alleviating 
its responsibility to process yearly work authorization requests filed by 
noncitizens granted withholding of removal; this a requirement that continues in 
perpetuity in the withholding context, but for only one year in the asylum 
context, after which an asylee is eligible to apply for permanent residence.309 
In the interim, or alternatively, the DHS should establish a policy by way of 
public memorandum in which it instructs its officers to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion to cancel or decline to enter reinstatement orders when a noncitizen 
expresses fear of removal or the intent to apply for asylum.  The DHS has already 
exercised this discretion in cases like Yesenia’s, but only after she litigated her 
case to the Ninth Circuit.  Exercising this discretion from the outset will allow 
the DHS to save considerable resources; the cost of litigating these cases at the 
immigration court, BIA, and circuit court, in addition to the detention costs 
during this time, are surely astronomical.310  These resources could be better 
allocated to solving the many, well-documented shortcomings within the DHS’s 
purview, including CBP officers’ substantial, unabated noncompliance in 
screening noncitizens in expedited removal, which the government already 
expended significant resources in commissioning USCIRF’s research.311   In 
addition to the significant conservation of resources, declining to reinstate 
expedited removal orders for noncitizens claiming a fear of return would prevent 
the “grave injustice of depriving these individuals of the right to seek asylum on 
their second attempt for the sole reason that they were wrongfully deprived of 
that opportunity on their first try.”312 
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 312. Human Rights Watch Letter, supra note 235. 
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Moreover, as long as the current regulatory scheme remains in effect, the DHS 
and the courts working with petitioners in withholding-only proceedings should 
apply the plain language of the statute, requiring actual illegal reentry to trigger 
the reinstatement provision, since currently, CBP initiates reinstatement 
proceedings any time a noncitizen has a prior order of removal, including when 
the noncitizen arrives at the border, and has therefore not effected an illegal 
reentry.313 
Finally, the DHS should undertake rulemaking to instruct CBP to follow the 
same script in the reinstatement interview as CBP follows in the expedited 
removal screening interview.  The risk of removing a bona fide asylum seeker 
is no less in reinstatement proceedings, and therefore the safeguards against 
errant removal should be the same in both contexts.  This will also create 
consistency within CBP interviews, since the same form and questions will be 
asked in any summary exclusion proceeding.  Additionally, the DHS should 
increase agency transparency by making the CBP’s electronic Officer Reference 
Tool (ORT) available.  It is unclear what guidance CBP currently follows; not 
knowing the internal rules CBP officers follow is particularly troubling given 
CBP’s refusal to comply with statutory and regulatory mandates. 
C.  Recommendations for the Judiciary 
Federal courts presented with the issue of whether reinstatement of removal 
orders bar asylum access should find that pursuant to statutory analysis of §§ 
1158 and 1231, the asylum provision is an exception to the reinstatement 
provision’s general bar to “all relief,” and hold that any noncitizen may apply 
for asylum, subject to the limited exceptions enumerated in § 1158.  Based on 
this statutory interpretation, federal courts should also find the withholding-only 
regulation is invalid under Chevron.  Not only will this give life to Congress’s 
legislative intent, but it will also further the long-held policy goal of ensuring 
asylum seekers are afforded protection in the U.S., a goal currently thwarted due 
to widespread errors in the issuance of expedited removal orders, and 
exacerbated by the reinstatement of these errant removal orders. 
Immigration courts and the BIA, although bound to apply the withholding-
only regulation, should consider the overwhelming evidence of CBP 
noncompliance in the screening of asylum seekers—particularly the evidence of 
CBP discouraging noncitizens’ expression of fear, harassing those who do 
express fear, and misrepresenting the noncitizen’s testimony on official forms—
and, accordingly, give no weight to records created during CBP and asylum 
officer interviews.  Not only is this in line with what some federal courts have 
already commanded, this also comports with Congress’s intent that asylum 
seekers in expedited removal be treated the same as other noncitizens seeking 
asylum.  Because asylum seekers who are not in expedited removal are not 
interviewed by CBP, they are therefore not forced to overcome discrepancies 
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arising from CBP records and subsequent credible fear records during their 
merits hearing testimony before an immigration judge; these discrepancies 
constitute one of the main reasons cited by immigration judges for denying 
relief.314 
Additionally, all courts should permit noncitizens to reopen their asylum 
applications in extraordinary circumstances or when country conditions have 
changed, notwithstanding a reinstated removal order.  This is an explicitly 
legislated exception to other legislated bars on access to asylum, and therefore 
an applicable exception to the reinstatement bar.  This is especially necessary 
given the many errant removal orders entered in the expedited removal and 
reinstatement processes.315 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Reinstated removal orders should not bar noncitizens like Emely, who fled 
horrific persecution in her home country and sought protection in the U.S., from 
applying for asylum.  Legislative history and the plain language of the INA show 
that contrary to the Agency’s regulatory scheme that restricts Emely and 
countless other noncitizens with reinstated removal orders to withholding of 
removal relief, Congress did not intend for the reinstatement of removal 
statutory provision to serve as a bar to asylum access.  Instead, Congress 
intended for asylum seekers to have the right to seek asylum even when placed 
in summary exclusion proceedings. 
Canons of statutory interpretation also support this conclusion; these 
interpretive guides all point to an interpretation that treats the INA’s asylum 
provision as an exception to the more general reinstatement of removal 
provision, thereby allowing noncitizens with reinstated removal orders to seek 
asylum.  Because this interpretation directly conflicts with the Agency’s 
interpretation as promulgated in the regulatory scheme, it is invalid under 
Chevron. 
Furthermore, the Agency’s interpretation is owed no judicial deference under 
Chevron because the Agency’s interpretation yields absurd and manifestly 
unjust results, especially given the ample evidence that expedited removal orders 
are often errantly entered, in addition to the sobering reality that noncitizens who 
experience persecution for the first time after being deported are forever barred 
from seeking asylum protection. 
If the six recommendations this Article makes are even partially implemented 
by Congress, the Agency, and the judiciary, significant progress would be made 
toward giving life to Congress’s legislative intent: to protect bona fide asylum 
seekers who have fled persecution and torture and sought refuge in the Land of 
the Free and Home of the Brave, a core value this country has embraced since 
its founders arrived at America’s shores, having themselves fled persecution. 
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